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Active labor market programs have been widely implemented  in OECD countries for over two
decades and over the past few years the Bank has become increasingly involved in providing  assistance
to client countries to design such programs.  Inspite of their widespread use, there are polar positions both
within the Bank and among  policymakers and researchers  on the effectiveness  of active labor  market
programs - on the one hand, proponents of these programs argue that active labor market programs are
both necessary and useful, short only of a panacea for reducing unemployment and protecting workers,
while opponents contend that these programs as a waste of public money with high opportunity costs.
Part  of this  divergence  of views  arises  from the  fact  that  these  programs  have  rarely  been
rigorously  evaluated,  and,  until  recently,  the  evidence  from  evaluations  had  not  been  studied  in  a
systematic manner.  Building up on studies does by the OECD and the ILO over the past few years, this
paper contributes to the discussion by synthesizing the findings of these evaluations - over  100 studies -
and attempting to draw some best practice lessons.
This paper justifies the importance of doing a rigorous evaluation to examine the impact and cost-
effectiveness  of active labor market  programs.  Based  on  a thorough  evaluation  of  evidence, it also
shows that while some active labor market programs can be useful to some workers, their effectiveness




Many  interventions  in  the  formal  labor  market  are  clustered  under  the  title  "active  labor  market
programs"  (ALMP).  Such programs may lead to direct job creation (through additional jobs offered by a
new public works scheme), help the unemployed fill existing vacancies (through re-training to meet the
new job requirements), or improve the functioning of the labor market (through employment information
and labor offices). The analytics of these programs vary considerably; for example, public works is very
much a demand side intervention, training a supply side one, while labor market intermediation can be
seen as an attempt to bridge these two sides of the labor market.
Active programs vary in their aims. Some programs emphasize efficiency; for example, more information
leads to better job matching.  Others concern distributional aspects.  For example, public works can be
targeted to specific areas particularly hit by poverty.  Yet others can be introduced or maintained based on
political considerations; for example, retraining is offered to some groups of dismissed workers, while the
already unemployed could have filled these jobs.
These programs rest on the assumption that, for one reason or another, some market failure exists in the
labor market or in other markets (for instance, existence of monopolies in product markets).  Some also
rest  on  the premise  that  certain  market  outcomes are socially  unacceptable  (as  is the case  with  high
unemployment leading to social unrest).  Some people would argue, however, that the term "labor market
program;'  is a contradiction  in itself: if the market works,  no program should be required.  The policy
emphasis instead should instead be on making markets work.
The theoretical debate on the need for active and passive programs is bound to continue, depending on
the values and assumptions adopted by economists.  However, given that many countries do implement
these  programs,  a  more  pragmatic  approach  is  not whether  to  have  them,  but  whether the  intended
objective ("benefit") is met, and at what cost.  Empirical evidence from evaluations of active programs is,
in this respect, indispensable.
In this  paper, we survey evidence based  on the evaluation  of active labor market programs.  We have
examined about 100 evaluations.  Many of these studies have already been summarized by others (such
as OECD  and ILO), but we have also included a significant number of individual studies.  And though
most studies apply to OECD countries - mainly the U.S., Canada, U.K., Sweden and Germany - we have
added inforrnation on developing and transition economies such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic,
Turkey  and  Mexico.  While  it  can  be  argued  that  the  lessons  from  developed  countries  on  the
effectiveness of these programs may not be directly applicable to developing countries, it is unlikely that
these  programs  will be  more  successful  in developing  countries  given the  scarcity  of  administrative
capacity to implement these programs and the paucity of monitoring  and evaluation experience to study
their effectiveness.
The  studies  we  summarize  are  recent,  and  have  taken  advantage  of  the  advances  made  in  model
development  and  econometric  analysis.  However, a number  of  issues affecting the  reliability  of the
findings of these  studies for  guiding public policy remain  open.  First, there  are unresolved technical
issues,  such as handling  selection bias and assessing  deadweight and displacement/substitution  effects.
Second, there are a variety of data problems in the specific surveys.  These include benchmarking  pre-
intervention profiles (employment history, human capital attributes, etc.) and the tracking of participants
and non-participants for no more than one or at most two years while,  in many cases, the full impact of
policies  is unlikely to  plav out in this  short  period of time  (such  as in the case  of training  and  self-
iiemployment).  Third,  administrative  data  which  may  be  called  upon  to  provide  supplementary
information tend to be surprisingly poor, so that the nature or the intensity of the intervention received by
the participant is often uncertain.
While these remarks indicate that a definitive conclusion on which and under what conditions ALMP can
be justified economically, the evidence points to some generalizations about active labor programs.  We
summarize them programmatically:
*  Public works can help the more disadvantaged groups (older workers, the long-term unemployed,
those  in distressed regions)  as a  poverty/safety  net program.  They are  ineffective  instruments  as an
escape route from permanent unemployment.  Program participants are less likely to be employed in an
unsubsidized job, and they earn less than individuals in the control group.
*  Job search assistance has positive impact and is usually cost-effective  relative to other ALMPs.
Programs that have  yielded positive results  have  generally  been  implemented  under  favorable  macro-
economic conditions.  However, job search assistance  does not seem to significantly  improve either the
employment prospects or wages of youth.
*  Training for  the long-term unemployed can help when the economy is improving.  Small-scale,
tightly  targeted on-the-job  training programs,  often  aimed  at  women and  older  groups,  offer the  best
returns.  However, the cost-effectiveness of these  programs is generally disappointing.  The real rate of
return is rarely positive, and they are no more successful than job search assistance programs in terms of
post-program  placement and wages.  A  caveat here  is that job  search assistance  may  not be a  direct
substitute for training as it may cater to different groups of the unemployed.
- Retraining for  those laid off en masse usually has  little positive  impact  and, as in case for the
long-term unemployed, it is more expensive and no more effective than job-search  assistance.  Again, job
search assistance  may  not be a direct  substitute for retraining,  as the target  groups  may be somewhat
different.
X  Training for  youth  generally has  no positive  impact  on employment  prospects or post-training
earnin,s  - it clearly cannot make up for the failures of the education system.  Taking costs into account,
the real rate of return of these programs in both the short- and long-run is usually negative.
- Micro-enterprise development  programs  are usually  taken  up  by  only  a  small  fraction  of the
unemployed and are associated with high deadweight and displacement effects.  The failure rate of these
businesses is quite high.  As in the case of training for the long-term unemployed, assistance targeted at
particular  groups - in this  case, women  and older  individuals  - seems  to have  a  greater  likelihood of
success.
*  Wage subsidy programs are unlikely to have a positive impact.  They have substantial deadweight
and  substitution  effects,  and  the  wage  and  employment  outcomes  of  participants  are  also  generally
negative as compared to a control group.  Careful targeting can reduce, but not eliminate, substitution and
deadweight effects, and further controls may be necessaryv  to ensure that firms do not misuse this program
as a permanent subsidy program.
There are polar positions on the effectiveness  of active  labor market  programs.  On one hand,
proponents  of these  programs argue that active  labor market programs  are both  necessary and  useful,
short only of a panacea for reducing unemployment  and protecting workers.  Opponents of the programs
tend  to summarily dismiss these  programs as a waste  of public money  with high  opportunity costs to
other  social programs  and  labor  market  efficiency  as  a  whole.  Based  on  a  thorough  evaluation  of
evidence, this paper shows that some programs can be useful to some workers in some cases.  There are
also  good design features for each program,  but external (to the programs) conditions need to be taken
into account (a good program in one country can prove to be a bad one for another; a program found to
iiibe useful in the past may no longer be the case).  This calls for realism in setting the objectives of ALMP
and also  setting standards against which active labor market  programs should be evaluated.  However,
due to lack of evaluative evidence, the conditions under which programs will succeed have not been fully
identified.  A very broad generalization  on the effectiveness of these programs  leads to the conclusions
that:
*  Some of these programs - such as wage subsidies or training for youth - are unlikely to be cost-
effective instruments in reducing unemployment.
*  Some programs  - such  as job  search  assistance  - are  likely to  have  positive  impacts on  the
probability of finding employment if they are well-designed and implemented.
*  However, the impact and cost-effectiveness of most of the active labor market programs depends
not only on their design, but also on the overall macro and labor market framework  in which they  are
designed.
This assessment dictates the following policy approach:
*  If a country is going to institute labor market programs, a good practice is to start with modest
programs.
*  Sound impact evaluation techniques should be used to evaluate the instituted programs. Relying
only on non-scientific evaluations may lead to incorrect policy conclusions.  A good micro evaluation
will involve comparing labor market outcomes for individuals who have gone through a particular
program with those of a control group of their peers and will also utilize data on program costs.  These
will help to answer the important questions: (a) what is the impact of the program?; (b) are the impacts
large and costs low enough to yield net social gains?; and (c) is this the best outcome that could have
been achieved for the money spent?
*  Based on these evaluations, the programs should be tightly targeted at those for whom they are
found to be the most cost-effective, or, if the evaluations point towards these programs being ineffective,
they should be amended or discarded.
ivACTIVE  LABOR  MARKET  PROGRAMS:
A REVIEW  OF THE  EVIDENCE  FROM  EVALUATIONS
I.  INTRODUCTION
This paper provides a review of evaluations of active labor market programs (ALMPs).  The empirical
literature on  evaluations of ALMPs  is vast and often provides  contradictory conclusions  depending  on
country, time period and specific program characteristics  under consideration.  The aim of this review is
to provide a summary of these evaluations and attempt to draw some best practice lessons.  Most of the
evaluations  come  from  industrialized  countries,  though  ALMPs  are  also  found  in  developing  ones.
International organizations, specialized research institutes and individual researchers have undertaken the
evaluations.  Most are in-depth studies of one policy  in a particular country (especially the US, Canada
and the UK) at a time, though some compare programs  in a cross-country context.  Data  problems, and
the  inability  to  track  participants  over  a  reasonably  long time  period  after  they  graduate  from  the
program, account for the variety of the results of ALMP evaluations in developing countries. In addition,
administrative  data  which  may  be  called  upon  to  provide  supplementary  information  are  often
surprisingly  poor, so the  evaluator is not sure about the nature or the intensity of the  intervention the
participant has actually received.
ALMPs are effectively an intervention: they are usually funded by public funds and payroll taxes and aim
to increase the allocative function of the labor market (such as in the case of job search assistance), direct
the  distributional  outcomes  of  labor  markets  (as  in  the  case  of  targeting  the  poor  in  public  works
programs), or increase the political acceptability of reforms (for example, retraining may  be provided to
retrenched workers to enable them to compete for other jobs).  Alternatively, ALMPs can be thought  of
as an instrument to correct some market failure (for example, to address a credit market failure in the case
of micro-enterprises)  or, even when  such a failure does not exist, to divert an "economically  efficient"
outcome to a "socially desirable" one.  In the latter case, political economy considerations are important.
For example,  if unemployment is deemed "unacceptably"  high, then an intervention to reduce  it in one
way or another may be considered appropriate, even though it may create some other inefficiencies in the
labor market or in other markets.  Often these social and political considerations dictate which programs
are to  be offered.  Evaluating ALMPs  is, therefore, a  complicated task, as they often address  multiple
objectives, for many of which there  are significant trade-offs.  This can be the case between efficiency
and  distribution  objectives,  or  between  those  two  objectives  and  political  economy  considerations.
Therefore, an evaluation of an ALMP  needs to take  into account the context and the objectives  of the
program.
Additional complications arise because of measurement problems.  Though the direct financial cost of a
program  is usually  known,  its indirect  (opportunity)  costs  are  typically  unknown.  For  example,  the
opportunity cost of re-training unemployed workers  includes the loss of opportunities for  offering pre-
employment  training  to  first  time job  seekers.  Similarly,  what  appears  as  a  benefit  to  a  program
participant may be offset by a corresponding loss among non-participants.  For example, a wage subsidy
can increase the employability of a dismissed worker.  However, he may take up a job currently filled by
a non-subsidized worker.Notwithstanding  difficulties  in the conceptualization  and measurement  of the effects  of ALMPs, there
have  been  many  studies  evaluating  some  or  all  aspects  of  these  programs,  such  as  their  costs,
effectiveness, efficacy, net impact, efficiency, sustainability as well as issues of program implementation.
These aspects  can be highlighted as follows: a job  created through a public works  program,  say, costs
$5,000 for one year and creates 3,000 jobs, all of which were taken up by newly unemployed.  In terms of
efficacy (the relationship  between project objective and outcome), the project may  have "failed,"  in the
sense that  it originally aimed primarily  at the long-term unemployed poor.  The net impact might have
been small or large depending on how many of the 3,000 newly unemployed would have found a job had
the program not been in place - if all 3,000 would have found a job of similar duration, earnings and so
forth, the net impact would be zero (alternatively  stated - the program has a 100% deadweight loss).  To
measure efficiency, one needs to know the net impact and compare it to total (direct and indirect) costs of
the program.  One can also add here the notion of "relative efficiency": even if this public works program
is found to have the desired effect, it may not be worth pursuing if there are alternative  interventions that
have higher social returns.
The preceding discussion shows that ALMPs are not "something for nothing": they can be useful but they
also have  costs.  In a period of scarce resources for social services  (broadly defined to  include health,
education,  pensions  and  assistance  to  the  poor  in addition  to  unemployed  workers),  it is  crucial  to
rigorously assess  whether these programs have  been successful in generating employment  and gains in
earnings for  those  who  participate  in them  in an  efficient  way. Hence,  evaluating  them  can provide
guidance about  when to  introduce them,  and how  to design  and  implement them.  At  the  same time,
evaluations can also suggest  when ALMPs  should  be adjusted  or be reduced  in scale  or,  for some of
them, even be abandoned.
The paper is arranged as follows.  Section II defines active and passive policies.  Section III examines the
patterns  of expenditures  on these  programs.  Section  IV discusses  the  importance  of evaluating these
programs and the techniques to perform the evaluations.  Section V discusses the results of evaluations
for the various active labor programs, and Section VI concludes.
2II.  WHAT ARE ACTIVE  PROGRAMS?
The use of policies aiming  to facilitate employment growth and re-employment started  increasing with
the rise  in unemployment  in OECD economies  after  1973.  These  policies,  later collectively  termed
'Active  Labor Market Policies" (OECD, 1993) included three main elements:
*  Mobilizing labor supply with job creation schemes, job subsidies and so on;
*  Developing employment-related skills with measures such as retraining;
*  Promoting efficient labor markets with employment services, job-matching  and counseling.
Within this framework, the more common ALMPs are (Table 2.1 describes these programs):  '
I.  direct job creation (public works schemes/public service employment) 2;
2.  public employment services/job search assistance agencies;
3.  training/retraining for unemployed adults and those at risk of unemployment;
4.  support to unemployed persons in starting up small businesses (micro-enterprise development);
5.  wage/employment subsidies to firms to hire unemployed individuals.
In theory,  ALMPs policies can lower structural unemployment two ways: by  promoting more efficient
matching  between job-seekers  and vacancies, and bringing discouraged and  socially excluded  workers
(such as the long-term unemployed or women workers who dropped out of the labor force) back into the
labor market. Targeted retraining  and employment services  would enhance their ability to re-enter the
labor force and compete effectively for jobs.  However, to the extent that unemployment is structural, one
might  argue that there  are  bound to be some adjustments  in demand  and  supply, with corresponding
changes in prices and incentives.  Thus, the use of ALMPs begs the question  as to whether one should
speed up the pace of adjustment, or leave it to market forces while spending funds in other social areas.
As time  has passed, the  need to  answer this  question has  become urgent.  Most ALMPs  in  OECD
countries  were  initially  introduced  to  counter  what  was  expected  to  be  a  short-term  increase  in
unemployment.  However, this did not materialize ("ratchet  effect")3,  and doubts were therefore raised
about the justification  of ALMPs.  For example, if a crisis  is expected to  last for a few months, then  it
may  be wise to  preserve  employment, even through wage  subsidies, to avoid what appear  to be high
private costs (such as costs of workers'  dislocation and fixed costs of firing/hiring for firms).  However,
if  the  crisis  lasts  longer,  it  does  not  requires  much  persuasion  to  conclude  that  deficit-financed
preservation  of  employment  can  be  unsustainable  at  the  macro  level  and  can  damage  labor  supply
incentives at the micro level.
1  There are several smaller programs that we have not mentioned in this overview.  In former Soviet Union countries. for
example,  vacancy fairs are regularly  organized.  In Russia in 1996, more than 2,500 vacancy  fairs were organized  in which
11.000 enterprises and 647.000 people participated.  Close to 100,000 people were placed in jobs as a result of these fairs.
2  While  we  use the  terms  public  works  and  public  service  employment  interchangably,  public  works  usuallv  refer  to
physical/civil works to develop infrastructure  usually carried out in developing countries.  In OECD countries, similar programs
are denoted as public service employment and may be used to employ individuals as. for examples, nurse aids and teachers aids.
3 Average unemployment levels reach new highs  in successive recessions and stay above  their previous level  in periods  of
boom.
3As ALMPs became more permanent features  of OECD  labor markets,  the need for evaluation  became
more pressing. In the next section, we examine evaluation  evidence after we present some statistics on
expenditures on ALMPs
4Table 2.1
Active and Passive Labor Market Programs: Some Key Features
Program  Description  and  Objective  Examples  of Bank  Possible  Pros  Possible  Cons  Some Key Issues
Projects
I. Public  P'ublicly  funded  low-wage  Road construction  - I. May assist  disadvantaged  1. Crowding  out of private  1. How long should  job last?
Works  arid  employment  to address  Rwanda,  Albania,  groups  to regain  labor  sector  jobs, especially  if  2. What  should be the wages
Public  poverty  arid  nutr  ition  Colombia,  market  contact.  targeting  is ineffective.  on the job?
Service  objectives  and create  Morocco;  2. Leads  to production  of  2.  Stigma  attached  to them may  3. What  should the proportion
Employriienit temporary  employmtietit  - Sewage/waste  public  goods  and develops  not increase  individual's  of wages in the total  program
these programils  are mainily  collection  - infrastructure.  employability.  cost  be?
income-generating  schemes  Senegal,  Lithuania,  3. Self-targeting,  if wages  3. Jobs may  be of low  4. Ilow should the benefits  of
r ather  than autonomilous  Morocco;  are set effectively.  productivity.  such a job be maximized
employment  generation  ConstrLuction  of  4. Program  imay be used  to  despite  their low  marginal
schools  and health  get people  off social  productivity?
care facilities  - assistance  - people  refusing  5. Are these  programs
Madagascar,  jobs are not provided  effective  in generating
Hlonduras,  unemnploymenit  insiurance.  employnient  and higher  wages
Indonesia,  Yemen.  for program  participants,  and
are they cost-effective?
6. Should  private  or public
contractors  be hired  to
implement  the projects?
2. Job  'lihe  main  objective  of  Provision  of  1. Helps  reduce  the length  1. Crowding  out of private  1. What is the role of private
search  employment  services  is  counseling  services  of unemploynment.  services.  job search  agencies?
assistance/  brokerage  - matching  jobs  to displaced  workers  2. Reasonably  inexpensive.  1. Deadweight  loss  - individuals  2. What is the effectiveness  of
Employment  with  job seekers. Job-search  -Turkey;  Assisting  3. Used  to pre-screen  who  get jobs through  counseling  services?
Services  assistance  comprises  many  redundant  workers  participants  who  may get  employmnent  services  are  3. What  training/material  do
different  types  of services;  for  in  their  job search,  assistance  from other  generally  the most qualified  and  staff in employment  offices
example,  initial  inteiviews  at  including  ALMPs.  would  have gotten  the jobs in the  need to perform  their functions
employment  offices,  in-depth  preparation  of  absence  of these  services.  more effectively?
couliselinig  durinig  the  resumes  and  2. Benefits  only a fraction  of
unemploymilent  spell,  job  providing  job-seekers.





Active and Passive Labor Market Programs: Some Key Features
IProgram  Description  and  Examples  of Bank  Possible  Pros  Possible  Cons  Some  Key Issues
Objective  Projects
3.  TIr  aining  Ains  at helping new  Establish a training  1.  Increase in productivity  1.  Usually programs are  1.  How can these programs
and  entranits  to the labor force  program to help  of unemployed individuals.  poorly targeted, resultinig  in  be better targeted?
Retraining  and redeployed workers  retrenched workers - 2.  When well-targeted may  deadweight loss - those who  2.  Is unemployment arising
(either the long-terimi  Jamaica; Improve the  benefit some groups (e.g.  benefit from the training are  due to skill shortages?
uLnemployed  or those laid  effectiveness of training  the disadvantaged, women).  those who would have gotten  3.  What is the durationi of
off en masse)  to  programs by making  jobs anyway.  these programs and how
accumulate skills that will  them demand-driven  - 2. Job search intensity may be  effective are they in isolation
enable them to compete for  Cape Verde; Provide  reduced during the course of  or in coordination with other
jobs.  adult training for  training.  labor market programs?
unlemployed  workers to  3.  Do poorly when the  4.  What is the role of the
reorient their skills - economy is not growing (i.e.  government and the private
Romania; Finance  wheni  there arc few jobs) and  sector in the provision and
apprenticesliip programs  this is typically the situation  financing of traininig?
to promote employmenit  during which they are  5.  How cost-effective are
for youths --  Argentinia.  instituted the most.  these programs: are people
4.  One of the most costly  who go through these
ALMPs instituted the most,  programs better off in terms
of wages and re-employment
probabilities?






Active and Passive Labor Market Programs: Some Key Features
Program  Description  and  Examples  of Bank  Possible  Pros  Possible  Cons  Some  Key Issues
Objective  Projects
4.  Micro-  Creating and  Support private micro  1. Assist in creating  1.  Individuals who form  1.  What kind of support - e.g.
enterprise  promoting small-  earning generating  entrepreneurial spirit.  micro-enterprises would  finanicial/techinical  - should be provided
Development  scale new  activities through  2.  An alternative to  have formed them anyway  to those starting up an enterprise?
businesses and  establishlmlent  of a  unemployment  without this assistance  2.  What is the duration of this support?
providing self-  Funld  -Eritrea;  insurance.  (deadweight loss).  3.  What instruments should be devised to
employment  Promotion of small  2.  Small businesses who  most effectively screen potential
through technical  businesses through the  do not get this assistance  participants?
assistance, credit  development of small  may be displaced.  4.  What is the impact of these programs -
and other support.  business incubators  - what is the proportion of unemployed that
They are often  Albania; Credit to  take advantage of these benefits,  the
aimed at countering  women to help in  proportion of businiesses  that survive and
"market failures,"  starting up small scale  how many additional jobs are created?
not in the labor  enterprises in rural
market but in the  areas - Morocco; Small
capital or land  business incubators-
markets.  Poland.
5.  Wage  Generally aimed at  Provision of wage  I.  May lead to  I.  Deadweight loss - I.  WhIo  should receive the subsidy - the
Subsidies  the long-term  subsidies to firms to  permanent employment  those that are provided  employer or the employee?
unemployed and  hiire  unlemployed  - by helping individuals  subsidies would be hired  2.  What is the duration of the subsidy
youthl,  these are  Argentina; Wage  develop some work-  anyway.  and mode of payment (lump sum or
designed to  subsidies to firms - related skills.  2.  A worker taken by a  spread out over time)?
subsidize  Poland and Flungary.  2.  Helps individuals  firm in a subsidized job is  3.  At what point in the unemployment
employer's  cost of  maintain contact with  substituted for an  spell should the subsidy be offered?
hiring unemployed  thc labor market.  unsubsidized worker who  4.  Is the subsidy more effective when
individuals.  The  3.  May be somewhat  would have otherwise  combined with any other intervention
governmenit pays  equitable -providing the  been hired.  The het  (e.g. training)?
part of the salary for  long-term unemployed  employment effect can be  5.  What is the effectiveness of these
a period of timie  with jobs even if it  zero.  programs: how maniy individuals are
following whichi  happens at the expense  3.  Employers may view  retained in their jobs/find new jobs at the
firms may decide to  of the short-term  workers as cheap labor  end of the apprenticeslhip and how many
hire the individual  unemployed,  and lay them off once the  rejoin the rolls of the uLnemployed?
and pay the entire  subsidy period ends.
salary.
7III.  EXPENDITURES  ON ACTIVE  LABOR  MARKET  PROGRAMS
In 1985/86, industrialized OECD countries spent about 0.75 percent of GDP on average on these programs4
There was significant variation across countries - while the U.S. spent 0.3 percent of GDP on  ALMPs,
Sweden spent over 2.1 percent of GDP on these programs.  By  1992/93, average expenditures on these
programs had risen somewhat to about 1.1 percent of GDP but the average has remained roughly constant
since  then (Table 3.1).  Since the  late  1980s, transition economies have  also instituted these programs.
Expenditures  on  ALMPs  in transition economies  included  in the  Table  are  lower  on  average than  in
industrialized countries and have declined since the beginning of the decade.
Table 3.1
Public Expenditures on Active Labor Market Programs in OECD Countries
(as % of GDP)
Country  1985/86  1992/93  1995/96
Australia  0.42  0.76  0.84
Austria  0.28  0.36  0.39
Belgium  1.23  1.21  1.41
Canada  0.63  0.67  0.56
Denmark  1.09  1.97  2.26
Finland  0.91  1.68  1.57
France  0.67  1.06  1.30
Germany  0.81  1.62  1.43
Greece  0.21  0.31  0.27
Ireland  1.58  1.31  1.75
Italy  0.45  1.88  1.08
Japan  na  0.09  0.10
Netherlands  1.09  1.40  1.37
New  Zealand  0.84  0.80  0.71
Norway  0.66  1.34  1.16
Portugal  0.41  0.87  0.83
Spain  0.34  0.59  0.67
Sweden  2.11  3.07  2.25
U.K.  0.75  0.59  0.46
U.S.A.  0.28  0.21  0.19
Unweighted  Average  0.77  (0.77)  1.08 (1.14)  1.03  (1.08)
Eastern  Europe
Czech  Republic  na  0.18  0.14
Hungary  na  0.61  0.43
Poland  na  0.38  0.32
Aote:  Averages in parentheses exclude Japan.
Source: OECD (1997.
4 These numbers pertain to national government expenditures.  In some countries, state and provincial governments also finance
such initiatives separately.
8In almost all OECD countries, training for the unemployed is "the largest category of active programs (Table
3.2), and is often perceived as the principal alternative to regular unemployment benefits" (OECD, 1994a).
In many countries, in fact, training - for those laid off en masse, for the long-term unemployed, and for
youth - accounts for over 50 percent of the expenditure on active labor market programs.  This is followed
by expenditures on employment services and public works programs.  Countries generally spend less than
10 percent of expenditures on  active programs on  micro-enterprise  development  or wage  subsidies, a
notable exception being Poland, where over 30 percent of public expenditures on active programs go into
these two programs.
Table 3.2
Distribution of Expenditures on ALMPs (% of Total Active Expenditure on ALMP)
(Selected OECD Countries 1995/96)
Country  Training  Public  Micro-  Job Subsidies  Emp.  Total  as %  of
Works  Enterprises  Services  GDP
Australia  33.7  26.5  3.6  7.2  28.9  0.84
Belgium  35.7  40.7  0.0  7.9  15.7  1.41
Canada  48.2  5.4  7.1  3.6  35.7  0.56
Denmark  77.0  12.8  3.5  1.3  5.3  2.26
France  55.8  17.1  3.1  12.4  11.6  1.30
Germany  55.2  21.0  2.1  4.9  16.8  1.43
Ireland  32.0  38.3  1.1  14.3  14.3  1.75
Netherlands  54.7  9.5  0.0  9.5  26.3  1.37
Sweden  59.1  19.1  3.1  7.6  11.1  2.25
U.K.  53.2  2.1  2.1  0.0  42.6  0.46
U.S.A.  57.9  5.3  0.0  0.0  36.8  0.19
Unweighted  Average  51.1  18.0  2.2  6.2  22.3  1.3
Eastern Europe
Czech  Republic  14.3  7.1  0.0  7.1  71.4  0.14
Hungary  30.2  25.6  0.0  14.0  30.2  0.43
Poland  40.6  21.9  6.3  25.0  6.3  0.32
Note: Training includes measures  foryouth  and the disabled, some of which may be non-training related
Source:  OECD (1997)
While  active  and passive  labor market  programs  are  common  in  OECD  countries, many  developing
countries have also instituted these programs.  Over the past few years, the World Bank has also been
involved  in  supporting active  labor  market  interventions  - with  the  exception  of job  subsidies  - in
developing countries.  Between FY92 and  FY96, the Bank has funded  projects which  have supported
over 270 such components across all regions (Table 3.3).
9Table 3.3
Distribution of World Bank Project Components on ALMPs by Region (FY92-FY96)
Region  Public  Micro  Training  Emp.  Adjustment
Works  Enterprises  Service  Services
Africa  43  22  23  2  5
Europe  and Central  Asia  20  10  13  13  6
East  Asia and  the Pacific  17  5  10  8  2
South  Asia  8  1  2  0  0
Latin  America  and  the Caribbean  21  14  10  5  2
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  I I  5  2  1
All  120  55  63  30  14
Note: Adjustment  Services  include  a variety  of active  programs,  often tied directly  to large-scale  privatization  programs  (e.g. in
Romania,  Turkey  and Macedonia).
Source: Dar and Tzannatos (1998)
Lending  for public works  programs forms  the bulk of the  Bank's  support for  ALMPs, but significant
resources have also gone into funding micro-enterprises  (especially in Africa, Latin America  and ECA),
training  activities  (especially  in  Africa  and  East  Europe  and  Central  Asia),  employment  services
(especially in East Europe, Central Asia, and East Asia) and adjustment services (especially East Europe
and Central Asia).
10IV.  THE IMPORTANCE  OF  GOOD  EVALUATIONS
In spite of the large public expenditures on these programs,  rigorous evaluations of ALMPs have been
relatively uncommon.  In the continuing effort to improve the targeting and efficiency of social programs,
policymakers are now increasingly realizing the importance of rigorous evaluations.  They want to know
what  programs  accomplish, what  they  cost,  and  how  they  should be  designed to  achieve  maximum
efficiency and cost-effectiveness.  These questions determine which of the types of evaluation are chosen
(Box 4.1).
Box 4.1: Main Types of Evaluations
*  Performance Monitoring:  These evaluations provide information on how a  system or program is
operating, and on  the  extent to which  specified program goals are  being achieved.  Examples  of
performance  indicators  in the  case  of  active  labor  market  programs  are:  proportion  of  program
participants employed, monthly earnings of program participants, cost of program  etc..  Results are
used by policymakers to assess program performance and accomplishments.
*  Impact Evaluations:  These evaluations focus on the question of causality.  Did the program have its
intended effects?  What was the magnitude  of the  effect?  Did  the  program have  any  unintended
consequences: positive or negative?  These evaluations, when  done well,  can be used to  compare
program outcomes with some measure of what would have happened without the programs.
*  Cost  and  Cost-Benefit Evaluations:  These  evaluations address  how  much  the  program  costs,
preferably in relation to alternative uses of the same resources and to the benefits being produced by the
program.
*  Process Evaluations:  These answer questions about how the program operates, and document the
procedures and activities undertaken in service delivery.  Such evaluations help identify problems faced
in delivering services and strategies for overcoming these problems.
Source: Harrell  et. al. (1996)
A comprehensive evaluation will include all the activities mentioned in the Box above.  However, in reality,
there  are  few such evaluations.  The questions raised,  the  target  audience for  findings,  and  resource
constraints limit the evaluation focus to one or two of these activities.  As we shall see in the next section,
the evaluations we have reviewed are almost exclusively impact evaluations.  In some of cases, where cost
data  are  available, cost evaluations have  also  been  done.  Below we  discuss  some of  the  evaluation
techniques used in performing an impact evaluation.
11A.  IMPACT  EVALUATION TECHNIQUES5
Techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of labor programs can be either scientific and non-scientific.
The  scientific  evaluations  are  of  two  types:  experimental  and  quasi-experimental.  Experimental  or
classically designed evaluations require selection of both the "control" and "treatment" groups- those who
receive the assistance and those who do not - prior to the intervention.  If large numbers of individuals are
randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, average characteristics of the two  groups should not
differ  significantly; thus,  any difference  in outcomes can be attributed to program participation. Quasi-
experimental  studies, select treatment  and  control  groups after the  intervention.  To  compute program
effectiveness, statistical techniques correct for differences in characteristics between the two groups.
Non-scientific techniques do not use control groups in evaluating the impact of interventions, relying instead
on statistics compiled by program administrators.  These evaluations are of little use in determining whether
program participants are doing better: without a control group, it is difficult to attribute success or failure of
participants to the intervention, since these effects are contaminated by other factors, such as worker-specific
attributes.  However, in some cases, these evaluations (e.g. interviews with employers and employees) can
provide some information on deadweight loss, as well as substitution and displacement effects. Nonetheless,
it is difficult to judge how robust the results are, as this will depend on how the sample of firns  was chosen
and how respondents were interviewed.  (Box 4.2  lists some of the commonly used terms in the  impact
evaluation literature.)
(i) Classically Designed (Randomized) Experiments
This technique was originally developed to test drug-effectiveness, with program participants and those
excluded from treatment randomly selected prior to the intervention. If large samples are randomly assigned
to treatment and control groups, observable and unobservable characteristics of the two groups should not
differ on average, and so any difference in outcomes can be attributed to program participation. The main
appeal here lies in the simplicity of interpreting results - the program impact is the simple difference between
the means of the samples of program participants and control group members on the outcome of interest.
The pitfalls are failure to assign randomly (because of nepotism, or excluding high risk groups to achieve
better results), changed behavior upon learning of assignment to either group (enrolling in private programs,
intensifying job search), high costs due to large sample sizes, and ethical questions about excluding some
people from the intervention.
While randomization is thought to ensure the absence of selection bias among participants, proponents of
randomized  experimentation  make  a  controversial  assumption:  that  randomization  does  not  alter  the
program behavior being studied.  This may not be the case, and in fact the bias induced by randomization
may  be  quite  strong  (Heckman,  1992).  For  example,  individuals  who  might  have  enrolled  in  a
nonrandomized regime may make plans anticipating enrollment in training.  With randomization they may
alter their decision to apply or undertake activities complementary to training (the Hawthorne effect).  Thus
risk-averse persons will tend to be eliminated from the program.
5  This section draws from Dar and Gill (I 998)
12Box 4.2:  Some Commonly Used Terms in the Impact Evaluation Literature
Some of the commonly used terms in the evaluation literature are defined below.
*  Deadweight  Loss:  Program  outcomes  are not different  from what  would  have happened  in the
absence  of the program.  For exarnple, wage subsidies place a worker in a firm which would have
hired the worker in the absence of the subsidy.
*  Substitution Effect:  A worker hired in a subsidized job is substituted  for an unsubsidized worker
who would otherwise have been hired.  The net employment effect is thus zero.
*  Displacement  Effect:  This usually  refers  to  displacement  in the  product  market.  A  firm  with
subsidized  workers  increases output,  but  displaces/reduces  output  among  firms who  do  not have
subsidized workers.  This can also occur in helping individuals start up enterprises.
*  Additionality:  This is the net increase in jobs created.  It is the total number of subsidized jobs  less
deadweight, substitution and displacement effects.
*  Treatment and Control Group:  Program beneficiaries  are the "treatment"  group.  In a scientific
evaluation, their outcomes are compared with a "control" group of individuals who did not participate
in this program.  The treatment and control groups  could be assigned at random ex-ante (before the
program) or chosen ex-post.  This will be discussed in detail in Section III.
*  Selection Bias:  Program outcomes are influenced by unobservable factors not controlled for in an
evaluation (e.g. individual ability, willingness to work).  Such factors can also arise as a by-product
of the selection process  into programs where  individuals  "most  likely to succeed" are selected into
programs ("creaming").
*  Randomization Bias:  This refers to bias in random-assignment  experiments.  In essence, this says
that the behavior of individuals in an experiment will be different because of the experiment itself and
not because of the goal of the experiment.  Individuals  in an experiment know that they are part of a
treatment group and may act differently, and the same  could hold true of individuals in the control
group.  The potential change in behavior is referred to as the Hawthorne effect.
(ii)  Quasi-Experimental Techniques
In these techniques, the treatment and control groups are selected afierthe intervention. To get the effect of
the program, econometric techniques correct for the differences in characteristics between the two groups.
The main  appeal lies in relatively low costs, and that  interventions can be done at any time.  The main
drawback is that these techniques - if done properly - are statistically complex. Attributes of individuals in
treatment and control groups are different; techniques for adjusting for differences in observable attributes
(e.g., sex, education, age, region) are relatively straightforward but subject to specification errors;  correcting
13for unobservable characteristics (e.g., motivation, family connections) requires a convoluted procedure that
can yield  wildly different results depending upon specification.  A quasi-experimental evaluations are of
three  types  - regression-adjusted  for  observables,  selectivity-corrected  (regression-adjusted  for  both
observables and unobservables), and matched pairs:
Regression-adjustedfor  observables.  This technique assesses the impact of participation in a program
when  the observable characteristics (e.g. sex, age, education) of the participant  and  comparison groups
differ.  This method is appropriate for computing program impact estimates when the difference between the
participant and comparison samples can be explained by observable characteristics.
Regression-adjustedfor  observed and unobservable variables (selectivity-corrected)  When selection into
programs  is not random,  and  participation  in a  program  is due  to  both  observable  and  unobservable
characteristics, program impacts computed using the technique in (i) above are likely to be biased.  The
concern is that even if participants and non-participants have similar observable characteristics, there are
some unobservable characteristics (e.g. innate ability) which would cause non-participants to have different
responses to the program if they had participated.  This technique uses the Heckman selectivity method to
try to control for these unobservables.
Matched pairs. As observable characteristics of the individuals chosen in the control and treatment groups
are bound to be different, these groups are likely to have different success rates in finding employment, even
in the absence of active labor market programs.  To control for these spurious differences, synthetic control
groups are constructed using a matched pairs approach. The synthetic control group, a subset of the entire
control group, is composed of individuals whose observable characteristics most closely match those of the
treatment group.
(iii) Relative Strengths Of Techniques
Estimating  the  effect  of  trainee  earnings  on  an  employment  program  using  randomized  and  quasi-
experimental techniques, Lalonde  (1986) has shown that randomized experimentation yields significantly
different results  from quasi-experimental techniques.  Policymakers  should be aware that available non-
experimental evaluations of training programs may contain large biases.
However, while randomized  experimentation is theoretically the best technique to estimate the effects of
interventions, quasi-experimental techniques may be superior in practice. The main weakness of randomized
experiments is that among those who participate in the evaluation, it is difficult - if not impossible - to ensure
that individuals in the control group do not alter their behavior in a way that contaminates the experiment.
For example, people who were denied participation in public training may enroll in private programs, which
would  bias  the  results  of any  evaluation  of public programs. 6 The  second weakness of  randomized
experiments is that  it may be difficult to assure that assignment is truly random.  For example, applicants
may  be  selected into the program due to  nepotism, or administrators of the  program may  intentionally
exclude high-risk applicants to achieve better results.  The third problem concems ethical questions about
treating  humans as experiment  subjects.  Finally, experimental evaluations are  only possible for future
programs, since the control and treatment groups have to be selectedex ante.
6  Heckman (1992) documents other limitations of this technique when applied to social experiments that arise due to selectivity
biases. as randomization may differentially affect the decision of people to participate in such prograrns.  For example. relatively
risk-averse persons may decide not to enroll for randomized experiments, preferring instead to enroll in private training.
A4Using the dual criteria of rigor and feasibility, then, randomized experiments are not necessarily superior to
quasi-experimental techniques.  Factoring in the high costs of setting up such experiments, and the fact that
the labor market programs which need to be evaluated are often already in place, randomized evaluations
should perhaps be the last alternative. Within quasi-experimental techniques, selectivity-correction may not
add much, especially when information is available for a considerable number of observable individual and
labor market characteristics (education, age, sex, household wealth, and region of residence).  Besides being
cumbersome  and  somewhat  unintuitive,  this  method  often  gives  arbitrary  results  depending  on  the
selectivity-correction specification used.
This leaves the matched pairs and the regression-adjusted techniques.  Between the two, the matched pairs
technique  is preferred for the following reasons: First, the procedure is less arbitrary because, since the
observable  differences  between  the  treatment  and  comparison  group  are  minimized,  functional  form
assumptions become less important.  Second, because program impact measures are a simple difference of
means  of the  variables  of interest (re-employment  probabilities  and  wages)  between  the  control and
treatment groups, they are easier to interpret by non-statisticians.
A weakness shared by both the experimental as well as non-experimental evaluations is that they do not take
into account displacement effects of the retraining program.  Thus, for example, in countries where demand
for  labor is constrained, retrainees may simply "bump" or displace previously employed workers so that
aggregate  unemployment may not change despite the size of the program.  In general, displacement implies
that the social benefits - from higher re-employment probabilities due to the retraining program - are lower
than indicated by the evaluation, however well done.
B.  THE IMPORTANCE  OF CONSIDERING COSTS
For the purposes of informing policy decisions, an evaluation is not complete until one considers the costs of
both the ALMP and its alternatives. As Box 4.3 illustrates, a program may be effective in a statistical sense,
but when costs are taken into account, it may not be effective economically.  Similarly, if training is shown
to  be twice  as costly as job  search assistance to  the  unemployed, but only  as effective  as job  search
assistance in facilitating access to jobs and wage gains, then job search assistance is twice as cost-effective
as retraining even though the two are equally effective. At least at the margin, this would constitute a case
for reallocating resources from training to job search assistance.  Unfortunately, costs appear to be the least
analyzed aspect of these programs in OECD countries.
Even the most careful impact evaluations of ALMP's  cannot be used for social cost-benefit analysis.  The
main reason is that retraining programs may simply result in displacement of previously employed workers
by the retrainees, so that aggregate unemployment rates remain unaffected by the intervention.  But when
done correctly, evaluations are good guides forprivate cost-benefit analysis, which policymakers can use to
institute cost-recovery in public programs and to promote private provision.  Evaluations may also help in
deciding whether ALMPs programs contribute to reduced budgetary expenditures by moving people off
unemployment benefits into productive employment, or whether are a net drain inspite of being effective in
doing so.7
7 Evaluators in Russia have proposed another simple. though less precise. way to compute the cost-effectiveness of their ALMPs
- comparisons of costs of employment programs with potential tax revenues from actual placements.  For example. the cost of
Russia's  Job Vacancy Fairs was Rb. 3.1 billion as compared to porential  tax revenues of Rb.  160 billion  from those who were
employed as a result of their fairs.
15Box 4.3:  Statistically Significant And Economically Insignificant?: An Example
Let us assume that a country with an annual per capita income of $20,000 institutes a retraining
program  that  costs  $10,000 per  individual trained.  The true impact  of the  program  is to  reduce job
search/unemployment  duration  by  three  days  for  men  and  two  days for  women  and  increase  post-
unemployment earnings by $5/month for men and $1 for women.
An effect can be statistically insignificant in a small sample...
If this retraining program was initially evaluated using small samples (for example,  50 men and
women), the indicated gender impact may be large or small (and can be wrongly found to negative) but
most likely will be statistically insignificant: the standard errors are large because of the smallness of the
sample.
but can become significant as sample size increases ...
As the sample size is expanded (to 500 men and 500 women for example), the impact of training
becomes increasingly statistically significant, and the results  show that  indeed the program reduces job
search/unemployment  duration  by  three  days  for  men  and  two  days  for  women  and  increase  post-
unemployment earnings by $5/month for men and $1/month for women.
still, this does not mean that the effect is economically significant.....
This will depend on the duration of unemployment and average wages.  If the average duration of
unemployment for both women and men were 10 days, the impact of the program on men is significantly
greater than that on women (by 50%).  However, there will be no practical difference  if the duration of
unemployment was six months.  Similarly, the impact on wages will depend on whether the beneficiaries
of the retraining program were low-paid workers (e.g. a monthly income of $250) or higher paid workers
(e.g. with a monthly income of $1000).  In the former case the increase in earnings is two percent for men
and 0.4 percent for women while in the latter case the impact  is 0.5 percent for  men and 0.1 percent to
women.
or efficient.....
Now compare the group of individuals who have been trained with a control group who were not
trained.  Assume that the training has a statistically significant impact on the probability of employment
of 10 percent.  Thus, if 60 percent  of the control group is employed, 70 percent of the treatment group
manage to find jobs  after completion  of their training.  This  implies that  100 individuals  need to  be
trained to place 10 extra trainees in jobs.  The cost of training  1  00 people will be $1,000,000, and the cost
per placement will then be $100,000.  Given that this is five times the per capita income of the country,
the program  is  unlikely to be  economically  desirable  even  though  it results  in a  positive  impact  on
employment.
16V.  AN INTERPRETATION  OF EVALUATION  RESULTS
The remainder of this paper presents our reading of the evaluative evidence (mainly from OECD countriest
of active labor market programs. In various appendices we have included summaries of the studies upon
which our synthesis is based.  The reader is encouraged to refer to them for a more objective presentation
of individual studies.
A.  PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMS/PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT
Public works programs are one of the most heavily funded ALMPs  in OECD countries.  Expenditures on
public works programs range from insignificant (close to zero percent of GDP in U.K. and the U.S.) to about
0.5 percent of GDP (Belgium and Ireland) in OECD countries. On average, OECD countries spend about a
quarter of all expenditure on ALMPs  on public works programs.  These programs have generally  been
instituted in times  of economic slowdown, and  participants are provided jobs  in various sectors of the
economy, e.g. construction, health, welfare and municipal government.
Public works often serve a dual objective; they provide temporary employment and act as a short-term safety
net.  Although most countries target  the displaced and the long-term unemployed ("the hardest to place
groups"). youths in some countries also participate as a way to introduce them to the world of work.  For
example, in Sweden, they have been used as a safety net for the young unemployed (Forslund and Krueger.
1994).  In other cases,  such as  Benelux countries, public works  have come to  be used as  an almost
permanent means of employment for those who would not find jobs elsewhere (OECD, 1993).
We  summarize the results  of thirteen  evaluations of public works  programs, nine  of which  are quasi-
experimental and four of which are non-scientific (see Appendix 5. 1).  Among industrialized countries, the
evaluations point to some general conclusions.
First,  non-experimental evaluations show  some desirable  short-run effects  in the  form of employment
increase/unemployment decline.  Second, some scientific evaluations suggest displacement effects which
can  reach  100 percent  (as they  did  in  Sweden; Skedinger,  1995).  Third, participants have  a  smaller
probability of being employed in a non-assisted job after participation in the program, and are likely to eam
less than their counterparts in the control group. 9 Finally, these programs do not seem to have a significant
impact on reducing long-term unemployment in the economy.
Among transition economies, Fretwell, Benus and O'Leary  (1998) provide the following summary picture
of  the  impact of public works  (called  "public  service employment programs")  in the  Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland (Table 5.110). In Hungary, these evaluations (O' Learv, 1998(a)) show that those who
participated in the program are over 20 percent less likely to be employed and earn about $15/month less
8 The World Bank is in the process of completing  a four-country study  (Hungary. The Czech Republic.  Poland and Turkey)
which uses state of the art quasi-experimental techniques to evaluate active labor market programs.  Some of the preliminary
results of this evaluation (for Hungary and Poland) are included in this paper.  See Fretwell. Benus and O'Leary (1998).
9 In many countries in the former Soviet Union, public works programs cater mainly to those individuals who want to participate
temporarily in the labor force (e.g. women with young children) and hence the issue of post-program comparison with a control
group is meaningless.
10  In this table initial employment and earnings refer to the probability that an individual in the treatment  group is employment
relative to someone in the control group - just after completing the program and at a later survey date respectively.  Similarly,
initial earnings and current earnings refer to the relative wage difference between treatment group and control group participants
- just  after completing the program  and at  a later survey date respectively.  The  unemployment compensation refers to the
difference in unemployment compensation paid to individuals the control group relative to individuals in the treatment group.
17than  individuals  in the  control group  after program completion.  While results  for  Poland  (O'  Learv,
1998(b))  are less negative, they also point to the lack of general effectiveness of these programs.  While data
on program costs are available, it is unnecessary to undertake a cost-benefit analysis:  the ineffectiveness of
the intervention suggests that it is unlikely to be cost-effective.
Table 5.1
Overall Impact of Public Service/Community Employment Programs in Transition Economies
Indicator  Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland
Initial employment  No impact  Negative  Negative
Current employment  Negative  Negative  Negative
Initial earnings  n.a.  Positive  n.a.
Current earnings  No impact  negative  Non impact
Unemployment compensation  Negative  No impact  Positive
Memo items
1. Cost per participant (US$)  625  1200  800
2. Cost per participant (PPP$)  1578  1867  1543
3. Per capita GDP ($US)  4740  4340  3230
Note:  1) Costs are  per participant,  not  per year.  For example,  in the Czech  Republic,  the duration  of participation  is 6 months
which  implies  that  annualized  program  costs  were twice  those  reported
2) The Purchasing  Power Parity (PPP) conversion  factor is defined as the number  of units of a country's currency
required  to buy the same  amount  of goods  and services  in the domestic  market  as one dollar  would buy in the United  States.
Source:  Constructedfrom  Fretwell,  Benus  and O'Leary  (1998)  (WDR  1997,  214-5)
These findings suggest that there can be some short-lived decline in unemployment as a result of individuals
joining the program, but there are no longer term "multiplier" effects in the sense of helping reduce the rate
of unemployment through re-integrating or increasing labor force attachment of the unemployed.
This  conclusion  is to a  large extent  predictable:  unlike  other ALMPs,  such as training,  retraining  and
support program for  self-employment, public works  provide  mainly current benefits  (temporary  safety
net)  and  are  only  escape  routes  from  unemployment.  Irrespective  of the  merits  of public  works,  an
economist's  first impression is that public works can be generally  expensive (Table 5.2) and are not an
effective instrument if the objective is to get people into long-term gainful employment.
Table 5.2
Annual Cost of Job Creation in Public Works
Egypt  Hionduras  Nicaragua  Madagascar  Bolivia  Senegal  Ghana
l. Cost/job (US$)  1401  2120  2580  786  2700  5445  2122
2 .Cost/job  (PPP)  7212  9759  14302  3620  9388  12100  10610
3. Per capita GDP (US$)  790  600  380  230  800  600  390
4. Ratio (1/3)  1.77  3.53  6.79  3.42  3.38  9.08  5.44
Source: Adaptedfrom  Subbarao  (1997,; WDR  199
18However,  public  works  can  be  a  short-run  anti-poverty  intervention  (Box  5.1).  That's  why  some
developing countries have used them extensively in periods of hardship, such as in Botswana, where  21
percent of the  labor force was employed in public works  in 1985-6, in Chile  (13 percent in 1983) and
Honduras (5 percent between 1990-3).  In other cases,  such as the Maharashtra Employment  Guarantee
Scheme in India, year-round employment  is guaranteed.  However, the wage rates  have been  set very
low, so that only the poorest are targeted.11 In Korea  public works were extensively used,  then were
gradually  phased  out  as  the  country  industrialized,  and  were  introduced  again  following  the  1997
financial crisis.
Box 5.1: What Makes a Public Works Program in a Low-Income Country?
Good design features include:
*  The wage rate should be set at a level no higher than the prevailing market wage for unskilled manual
labor in the setting in which the scheme is introduced.
*  Restrictions on eligibility  should be avoided;  the fact that one wants work at this wage rate should
ideally be the only requirement for eligibility.
*  If rationing is required (because demand for work exceeds the budget available at the wage set) then
the program should be targeted to poor areas, as indicated by a credible "poverty map"S.  However,
flexibility  should  be allowed  in  future  budget  allocations  across  areas,  to  reflect differences  in
demand for the scheme.
*  The labor intensity (share of wage bill in total cost) should be higher than normal for similar projects
in the same setting. How much higher will depend on the relative importance attached to immediate
income gains versus (income and other) gains to the poor from the assets created. This will vary from
setting to setting.
*  The projects should be targeted to poor areas, and should try to assure that the assets created are of
maximum value to poor people in those areas. Any exceptions -- in which the assets largely benefit
the non-poor -- should require co-financing from the beneficiaries,  and this  money should go back
into the budget of the scheme.
*  Performance in reducing poverty should be monitored using careful evaluations.
Source:  Ravallion (1998)
B.  JOB SEARCH  ASSISTANCE/EMPLOYMENT  SERVICES
Expenditures on these programs range anyvwhere  from five percent of active labor market program budgets
(in Denmark) to over 70 percent (in the Czech Republic).  On average, OECD countries spend about a
quarter of their active labor market program budgets on these programs.  It should be noted here that this
expenditure is often not used solely to  finance job  search assistance  programs, but  also to  finance the
administration of the unemployment benefit system, as well as the administration and costs of the other
active labor market programs.
I IRecent  evaluations of this scheme have showed that, due to a significant increase in the wages, the self-targeting nature of
the program has been somewhat compromised.
19Job search assistance is often justified on the grounds that are especially benefit the disadvantaged - while
the private sector provides core labor exchange services successfully to some segments of the labor force,
for  example,  the  employed,  skilled  and  the  white  collar  workers,  public  employment  services  are
beneficial for the poor, semi-skilled and long-term unemployed workers (Fretwell and Goldberg, 1994).
In the  evaluations examined, these  programs  aim  at assisting  a  varied group  of unemployed  and job
seekers - including the long-term unemployed in the U.K., women on welfare in the U.S., individuals laid
off as a result of industrial restructuring in Canada, and the youth in Holland.  Economic conditions  in
countries that have  instituted these programs  also vary significantly  - a steep decline  in unemployment
rates in the U.K. in the late 1980s as compared to a sharp rise in unemployment in Canada in 1989-1991
(Fay,  1996).  Job seekers are usually provided a wide range of services.  In Hungary and Poland in the
mid  1990s, for example,  they were  provided with job  referrals, job  counseling,  skills assessment, job
search training, resume  preparation and job  clubs (O'  Leary,  1998(a), 1998(b)).  In New Zealand they
were  assisted through  a job  screening  interview, workshops,  follow-up interviews  and  personal  case
management  (NZ  DOL,  1995).  In  Australia  they  were  helped  in  resume  writing  and  interviewing
techniques (Fay,  1996).
Of the  18 evaluations we  examined, all  except  one are scientific.  Six of the  scientific evaluations are
experimental and  11 are  quasi-experimental (Appendix  5.2).  The evaluations  suggest  that  job-search
assistance is in some serise one of the most successful active labor market programs: in the general case,
it costs little to provide and the program is not any less effective than alternative ALMPs.  It is, therefore,
the  low  cost that  drives  this  conclusion.  However, as  argued  below, much  depends  on  whether the
economy is growing or  in a recession  (as  far as effectiveness  is concerned)  and on the availability  of
public funds (which can be scarce during a recession).
More specifically, while some evaluations yield "negative" results, most studies indicate positive results,
and  in a few cases  large  ones.12 Less successful  programs  are generally  associated with  periods  of
recessions and rising unemployment rates.  For example, job search assistance to those laid offen  masse
in Canada in the late  1980s did not raise their probability of employment or earnings (as compared to a
control group) at a time when unemployment  was rising.  In fact, participants who had been laid offen
masse spent a significantly  greater amount of time searching for jobs than their counterparts who did not
use this  service (Fay,  1996).  On the other  hand, the  effectiveness  of job  search assistance  seems  to
increase when economic conditions improve; that is, when new jobs are generated.  During the decline in
unemployment rates in the Netherlands in the mid-to-late  1980s, program participants were more likely to
be employed than those in the control group (OECD, 1993).  Similarly, as the U.S. economy was growing
in the mid-to-late  1980s, program participants (usually female AFDC recipients) were four percent more
likely to  get jobs  and  earn  20  percent  more  than  the  control  group  (Gueron,  1990). Evaluations  in
Hungary and Poland also show that while the overall effectiveness of this intervention is not significant in
terms of increasing probability of employment, if the economy is improving, some subgroups of program
participants - particularly  women  - fare  significantly  better  than  non-participants  (O'  Leary,  1998(a),
1998(b)). However, several of the evaluations show that job search assistance had no beneficial impact on
youth irrespective of general economic conditions (Fey, 1996).
Job search assistance  is also supposed to be one of the most-cost effective  of the active interventions.
Leigh (1995) summarizes his findings of selected programs: job search assistance measures cost less than
12  Deadweight loss is rarelv measured in these evaluations.  It may happen that those who benefit from these services are those
who would have got jobs anyway because they were the most motivated in looking for jobs.
20training and retraining (two to four times), but appear equally effective.  This of course  does not mean
that job-search  assistance is a substitute for training - it is possible, for example, that those who use job
search assistance are more "employment-ready" than individuals who get training.  Hence, substitution of
one program for the other will only be the case if job  search assistance  and training programs cater to
roughly the same clientele.
Other evidence also seems to point in the direction of greater cost-effectiveness  of job search assistance
programs. One of the most extensive evaluations of these programs was an experimental  demonstration
carried out in the U.S. at five test-sites in Charleston, New Jersey, Washington, Nevada and Wisconsin
during the 1970s and the 1980s.  These evaluations showed a significant decline in the number of weeks
of  unemployment  insurance  claimed  by  program  participants.  They  also  showed  that  post-program
participants'  earnings were likely to be higher than those of individuals  in the  control group.  A cost-
benefit  analysis of these experiments  showed that these employment  effects (post-program  reduction  of
duration  of  search  among  participants  from  0.5  to  4  weeks)  were  associated  with  a  reduction  in
unemployment benefits paid out to participants (Meyer, 1995).13
Overall,  the evidence suggests that job search assistance can have  some positive  effects and  is usually
cost-effective  (relative  to other  ALMPs).  There  does  seem to  be  a positive  correlation  between  the
likelihood of success of a program and local labor market conditions.  Programs that have not yielded
positive results are generally associated with rising unemployment rates, while economic conditions have
been  generally favorable in the case where programs have succeeded. However, job  search assistance  -
like other interventions - does not seem to improve either the employment prospects or wages of youth
significantly as compared to a control group of their peers.
C.  TRAINING PROGRAMS
Training  (and re-training) generally  accounts for the  largest share of expenditures on  ALMPs  ranging
between 40% to 60% and reaching 77 percent (Denmark).  Spending on training can reach many different
groups,  and  in our summary  of the  review  below,  we  concentrate  on  (i)  retraining  programs  geared
towards those laid off en masse; (ii) training and re-training programs for the long-term unemployed; and
(iii) training programs geared towards youth.  We discuss the results of evaluations of these programs in
turn.
(i)  Training Programs  for  the Long-TernI Unemployed
We reviewed 23 studies - six experimental, 13 quasi-experimental and four non-scientific (see Appendix
5.3).  A few of these studies are longitudinal, so it is also possible to study the long term  impact of the
programs.
Though there  is no  generally  agreed definition of what  constitutes long-term unemployment,  the term
usually refers to those who have been unemployed for more than 12 months (OECD, 1993).  This group
tends to consist of "older" workers who used to be employed  in what turned out to be a declining industry
or region.  But significant variation exists among them in terms of age, skills, and education, especially if
unemployment is the result of regional depression.  For example, New Jersey's retraining program in 1986-
13  In a study by White and Lakey (1992) the duration of search of non-participants was on average 8 weeks  longer than those
of program beneficiaries.
2187 included mainly workers in their 50s (Anderson, Corson and Decker, 1991), while half of the long-term
unemployed workers in Gerrnany's who  participated in retraining programs were  less than  35  years old
(Johanson, 1994). In similar programs in Hungary and Poland, trainees ranged mid-20s to 50 years old (O'
Leary, 1998(a), 1998(b)).
Compared to  scientific evaluations, nonscientific  evaluations usually provide  an inflated picture  of the
effects of training and retraining programs on the long-terrn unemployed..*4  Scientific evaluations suggest
that the programs for the long-term unemployed can have a positive impact but this is not always the case,
and the  impact  is usually  small.  Evaluative  evidence of  some retraining  programs for  the  long-term
unemployed in the U.S.  shows that these  programs are also more expensive than job  search assistance
programs (approximately by a factor of two) (Leigh, 1995).
The success of programs for the long-term unemployed tends to be heavily dependent on the business cycle:
programs have performed better when they were instituted at times when the economy was expanding.  A
good example of this  is Hungary, where  training  outcomes  seem to  have  improved over  time  as the
economy started to grow (O'  Leary (1995,  1998(a)).  In general, programs seem to be more effective for
women  (Friedlander et. al., 1997; Goss, Gilroy et. al., 1989).  Longitudinal studies indicate mixed results -
while  in some cases the positive effects dissipated within a year  or two after program completion, in a
couple  of cases the impacts persisted.  For example,  in Sweden, labor market training provided to the
unemployed raised their earnings in the short-term but the long-term impact (over two years) was somewhat
negative (Meager and Evans,  1998).  Conversely,  long-term unemployed provided training as part of the
New Jersey Reemployment Demonstration project in the mid 1980's were earning more than the control
group more than two and a half years after program completion (Anderson, Corson and Decker, 1991).  In
most cases, retraining programs are generally no  more effective than job search assistance in increasing
either  re-employment probabilities or post-intervention earnings.  For example, evaluations of the Texas
Worker Adjustment Demonstration (WAD) program indicate that participants were likely to be employed
more  quickly than  non-participants.  However,  by the  end  of the first  year  after program completion,
employment opportunities for male participants were no better than those for non-participants, or for those
who only got job search assistance (Bloom, 1990).
Costs, when known, vary between $900 and $12,000 per person. In most cases the costs are found to be so
high compared to the benefits of the program that, even if the effects persisted for 10 years, the social return
of the program could remain negative (especially for males) (Friedlander et. al., 1997)j5  The U.S. JTPA
program appears to be a rare exception - both male and female participants were doing significantly better
than the control group and the training program was relatively inexpensive  (Box 5.2).
14 In many former Soviet countries, for exarnple, participants in public training programs are still guaranteed ajob  after completion.
With placement rates reaching close to 1  00 percent in these cases. non-scientific evaluations tend to show that these programs are
highly successful.
15  The  social return  is based  on a comparison of  measurable economic costs and benefits  and does  not take into account
possible extemalities associated with the reintegration of the ]ong-term unemployed  into the labor force or of reducing high
levels of unemployment in specific regions.
22Box 5.2: The U.S. Job Training Partnership Act Evaluation
The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) provided for programs which are national in scope and is targeted
at  disadvantaged adults  (aged  22  and  older) and  youth  (16  to  21  years  old).  Various  activities  are
undertaken  by  local service delivery  areas  (SDAs).  SDAs provide  specific employment and  training
services either directly through their own  staffs or by contracting with other local service providers (e.g.
community colleges or community based  organizations).  The specific training services offered generally
fall into one of two categories - classroom training and on-the-job training (other services provided were: job
search assistance, basic education and work  experience).  Classroom training includes both occupational
skills training in fields like clerical, food service, electronics, or home health care, as well as training in basic
academic skills.  On-the-job training consists of subsidized training that usually takes place as part of a
paying job, generally in the private sector.  The program pays half of the wages for up to six months, but the
job is supposed to be permanent. At the time the evaluation was done, the net cost of training per participant
averaged approximately $1200 for adults and over $2000 for youth - making it one of the least expensive
training programs in the U.S..
The  evaluation of the training  program was experimental  in nature, and  the research  team  undertook
extensive sensitivity analysis to examine possible underreporting bias and survey non-response bias in the
follow up surveys - these two being threats to the internal validity of experimental research. The experiment
was carried out at 16 sites.
Evaluation results show that the JTPA's effects on earnings are significant for men and women (an increase
of over 10 percent), with short-term classroom training having the least beneficial effects while on-the-job
training was more beneficial.  While evaluations of some other programs have also shown a positive effect
of training on women, the findings for men represented a break from the results of other evaluations which
have generally reported insignificant effects for men.  Extended follow up data show that effects for adults
continued  over  five  years  of  follow  up,  although  the  later  year  effects  are  smaller and  statistically
insignificant.  Like most other evaluations, the JTPA did not have a significant effect on increasing the
employment or earnings prospects of youth.
Cost-benefit analysis suggests that the societal rate of return for JTPA is over 50 percent for adults (the rate
of return is negative for youth), making it one of the few cost-effective adult training programs instituted in
the U.S.  However, in spite of the positive results, the evaluators caution that the aggregate effects of JTPA
are likely to be modest, both on the target population and on the labor force as a whole.  This is because the
effects diminish over time, and there is bound to be some substitution effect (whose magnitude was not
captured in the evaluation).  Further, it is unclear whether the high rates of return would still be observed if
the scale of participation was substantially increased. Unfortunately, little evidence exists on this issue.
One of the major implications emerging from the analysis is that training should not be seen as a panacea
for reducing unemployment  - it usually does not work, especially  if the economy is not growing.  The
evidence shows that programs aimed at the long-term unemployed, usually,  established in periods  when
the economy is doing better, are somewhat more effective (at least in the short-run).  Evaluations  also
show that small-scale tightly targeted on-the-job training  programs, usually aimed at women and other
23disadvantaged  groups  among the  long-term unemployed, often  offer the best  returns.  While  rigorous
cost-benefit  analyses of these programs are seldom carried out, where done, the evidence shows that the
real rate of return of these programs is rarely positive and these programs are not cost-effective - they are
no more  successful than job  search assistance  programs in terms of post-program placement and wages
while they cost anywhere between 2-4 times as much.  It needs to be stressed here again that this does not
mean that job-search  assistance programs are substitutes for training programs - these programs may be
serving different groups of the unemployed and hence cannot be directly compared on the basis of cost-
benefit analysis.
(ii)  Retraining Programsfor  Those Laid off En-Massel6
We summarize the results of eleven studies, five quasi-experimental, five non-scientific, and one which used
a variety of techniques  (Appendix 5.4).  The studies relate to retraining programs for workers displaced
through mass layoffs as a result of significant enterprise restructuring or plant closures. Unfortunately, none
of the evaluations was longitudinal, so they do not really  provide insights into the dynamics of the labor
market and longer-term benefits of retraining programs.
The  retraining  programs  under  consideration  were  offered  mainly  to  workers  in  the  automobile,
shipbuilding,  mining, steel and pulp industries.  The number of workers who lost their jobs vary from about
500 to 3,000 per plant.  Generally, these losses occurred during periods of high or rising unemployment
economy-wide, or contraction of the manufacturing. Most of the training provided was classroom-based,
and was generally accompanied by job search assistance.
Evaluations of three  retraining programs for US auto workers  show the  contrast between scientific and
nonscientific  techniques: in San Jose, a nonscientific evaluation indicated high placement rates, while in
Buffalo and Michigan - during the same period - scientific evaluations showed that these programs were
ineffective. More generally, nonscientific evaluations indicate that these programs are very effective with
high  placement rates of participant workers in jobs  following  completion of the  program (Alfthan and
Janzon, 1994).
T'he more  reliable  quasi-experimental evaluations challenge this  optimism: though  they  find  that  some
retraining programs may result in some modest increase in re-employment probabilities, this result is often
statistically insignificant (Corson, Long and Maynard, 1985).  The results for post-program earnings are
more discouraging: wage effects on participants (compared to control group workers) are rarely positive and
in most cases negative (OECD, 1991). In all, we conclude that, from an economic perspective and based on
the  evidence of  employment/wage impacts,  retraining must  have high  deadweight  cost.  These  results
compare unfavorably to the effects of programs for the long-term unemployed where there is some evidence
of positive impacts.
Evaluations seldom report the full costs of retraining but, when known, direct costs - usually measured as
total recurrent program costs - vary between $3,500 and $25,000 per participant (Dar and Gill, 1998).  This
makes retraining programs between two and four times  more expensive than,  say, job  search assistance
(JSA).  For example,  in Buffalo the cost of JSA per  participant was $850, while that of retraining was
$3,300.  Combined with the finding that retraining and JSA have roughly similar impact, this implies that
JSA can be more cost-effective in assisting displaced workers than retraining.  Some researchers have gone
as far as claiming that there is no evidence of any incremental effect above that of job search assistance for
16 This section is taken from Dar and Gill (1998).
24retraining programs (Corson, Long and Maynard, 1985). As before, it needs to be stressed here that these
programs may be serving different groups of the unemployed and hence may not be direct substitutes for
one another.
OECD  experience of retraining programs for  workers displaced en masse  may  be useful  in designing
assistance programs in transition countries and other economies that expect large scale labor redundancies.
The evidence on the lack of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of these programs suggest that they should
not be  the principal source of  support to assist  individuals to  move to  gainful  employment.  If  these
programs are to be used, they should be small scale and targeted towards those subgroups who can benefit
the most from them.
(iii)  Training Programsfor  Youth
of The most rigorous evaluations of training programs geared towards youth have been conducted in North
America  and  Scandinavia.  We  have  examined  seven  evaluations:  five  experimental  and  two  quasi-
experimental (see Appendix 5.5).
These  training  programs  usually  aim  at  assisting  school  dropouts  (often  paying  special  attention  to
youngsters who drop out prior to completing upper secondary education) or youth who come from severely
disadvantaged  families.  The  assisted  individuals are  typically  below  the  age  of  20.  The  evaluations
examined  different aspects of training  assistance for the  youth,  such as  classroom training,  on-the-job
training and, in one case, job search assistance.
Evaluations results for youth training are the most discouraging of all (that is, compared to training programs
for the long-term unemployed and those laid-off en masse), even though the programs examined here were
often introduced in periods of relatively stable or declining youth unemployment  They show that training
rarely has an effect on earnings or employment probabilities of program beneficiaries compared to their
counterparts in some control groups.  In almost all cases, participants did no better than the control group
either in enhancing their post-training employment probability or their earnings (Fay, 1996; DOL, 1995). A
more mixed, and more promising, picture arises from the evaluation of the Canadian Job Entry Program.
Though a quasi-experimental evaluation of the program showed that youth who only undertook classroom
training did no better than their comparators, those who undertook enterprise training did significantly better
than the control group (OECD, 1993). This positive effect was attributed to youngsters staying-on with the
training firms.  Still, enterprise training seem to be more effective for young men, with little effects on
young women.
Cost-benefit analysis of several of the youth training programs suggests that the  social rates of return to
these programs are typically negative both in the short- as well as the long-run (Friedlander et. al., 1997).
The evidence suggests that it is very difficult to correct what appears to be a failure of the education system
during the previous 5-10 years of the youth's  life with some kind of training which is usually short in
duration and takes place relatively late in life.
D.  MICRO-ENTERPRISE  DEVELOPMENT  (SELF-EMPLOYMENT)  SCHEMES
We  have  summarized  the  results  of  thirteen  evaluations of  programs  aimed  at  helping  unemployed
individuals  start  up  their  own  businesses: two  of  the  evaluations are  experimental,  five  are  quasi-
experimental and the rest are non-experimental (see Appendix 5.6).  These programs come under a variety
25of names such as micro-enterprise schemes or self-employment schemes but below we generically refer to
them as "micro-enterprise development assistance" (MEIDA).
MEDA attracts limited funds compared to other active labor market policies: no OECD country spends more
than 10 percent of expenditures on ALMPs on such programs.  In general, these programs are not targeted at
any particular group.  For example, such assistance has been given to the newly unemployed (such as in
Massachusetts, U.S., in the early 1990s), to those who have been unemployed for at least five months (such
as in Denmark in the 1980's) and those who were laid-off in Hungary and Poland in the 1990's.  Similarly,
they are available under varied economic conditions.  In Ireland, for example, these programs were instituted
in the mid 1980s at a time when unemployment rates were high (around 15 percent) and rising.  In Australia,
on the other hand, they became more common in the late 1980s when unemployment rates fell from eight to
six percent.
Program conditions also vary, for example; participants may receive assistance to set up their businesses as a
lump-sum payment  or periodic  allowances.  Often there  is  "screening",  that  is, potential  beneficiaries
undergo a rigorous assessment which evaluates their likelihood of success (for example, in Germany) but in
other countries, such as the US,  screening is more cursory  (Wilson and Adams,  1994).  In most cases
participants may also receive post-startup business advisory services and business counseling.
Though theoretically the idea that someone who cannot get ajob  as an employee will be inclined to become
self-employed makes sense, very few among the unemployed are tempted to take up opportunities for self-
employment.  Generally, the take-up rate among the unemployed hovers at  no more than five percent in
OECD countries (Wilson and Adams, 1994). One explanation for this may be that individuals are generally
risk averse, and given a choice between getting unemployment benefits or money to start up  a - possibly
unsuccessful - venture, prefer to get the unemployment benefits.
As usual, non-scientific evaluations provide more encouraging results than scientific evaluations.  Still, there
is general agreement that MEDA programs have high deadweight loss.  Estimates of deadweight losses vary
from about 30 percent in the self-employment experiments in Massachusetts and Washington State in the
late  1980's and  early  1990's  (Fay,  1996) to  over  50  percent in  Canada's  self-employment  assistance
program in 1992-93 (Graves and Gauthier, 1995) and Denmark's enterprise startup grant in the late 1980's
(Balakrishnan, 1998). In Ireland, the estimated 50 percent deadweight loss seems to have been accompanied
by a 30 percent displacement effect - this  led to a small net employment  impact of 20 percent (OECD,
1993).
Evaluations  show  that  businesses  are  short-lived  - typically  one-third  to  half  of  MEDA  created
businesses close down in the first year of their operation.1 7 For example,  in Denmark, the failure rate of
business is 60 percent in the first year and  in Australia it is more than 70 percent in the first two years.
Results  are  more  encouraging  in  Canada  where  a  crucial  feature  of  this  scheme  is that  individuals
contribute up to 25 percent of the start up costs  of the business: there, the first year's  failure rate is only
20 percent.  In France
17 We do not have data on failure rate  of small businesses who did not take part in MEDA programs.  However, anecdotal
evidence seems to suggest that usually these rates are similar to those of that of MEDA businesses.  Thus, while MEDA created
businesses do no worse in terms of survival rates than businesses which did not benefit from the program, they do not appear to
do any better.
26the failure rate is 50 percent but over a period of five years (Table 5.3).  Evidence seems to show that
businesses assisted through mentoring and business counseling are more likely to succeed.
Table 5.3
Failure Rates of MEDA businesses
Program  Failure  Rate
Australia  in the late 1980's  (New Enterprise  58% of businesses  failed  within first year and 71  %
Initiative)  within two years.
Canada  in the early 1990's  (Self-Employment  20% of businesses  failed  within first year
Assistance  Program)
Denmark  in the mid to late 1980's (Enterprise  60% of businesses  failed  within first 12  months
Allowance  Schemes)
France  in the early 1980's (Micro-Enterprise  50%  of businesses  failed  within 4.5 years.
Development)
Hungary  in  the mid 1990's (MEDA)  20% of businesses  failed  within first 15  months.
Netherlands  in the early 1990's  50% of businesses  failed  within four vears.
Poland  in the mid 1990's  (MEDA)  15%  of businesses  failed  within first  two years.
U.S.  in Washington  in 1990  (Self-Employment  37% of businesses  failed  within the first 15 months
Experiment)
Source: Summarizedfrom  Appendix  5.6
While there are high deadweight losses and high rates of business failures, MNEDA  participants seem to fare
reasonably well in terms of employment outcomes as compared to a control group.  Scientific evaluations
show that participants are more likely to be employed than individuals in the control group in almost all the
programs for  which  such evaluations  exist.  However, this  does  not  necessarily translate  into  higher
earnings.  For example, in the Washington self-employment experiment, while participants are  more likely
to be employed than the control group, they earn significantly less (Fay, 1996).  In Hungary, participants
were as likely to be employed as individuals in the control group, but earned $30/month less (O'Leary,
1998(a)). In the case of Poland, on the other hand, participants were 25 percent more likely to be employed
than the control group and eamed significantly more (O'  Leary, 1998(b)).  In the  Hungarian and  Polish
programs, women and older workers generally had better outcomes than individuals in other sub-groups.
Even in cases of businesses that survive, there is only a small multiplier effect.  Most surviving businesses
create, on average, half an additional job.  In Hungary, each surviving enterprise created 0.3 additional jobs,
in France, 0.5, and in Australia, during a period of declining unemployment, 0.7 (OECD, 1993; Wilson and
Adams, 1994).
While there  is some scattered data on  costs,  the cost-benefit  issue has  rarely been  addressed.  Where
available, data indicate that the cost of starting up a small business vary from $4500 (in France) to $13,000-
$14,000 (in Canada and Denmark).  The Canadian evaluation states that the long-term cost-effectiveness of
these programs is uncertain, while preliminary analysis from Poland and Hungary indicate a loss to the
unemployment insurance system with both the average duration and level of unemployment benefits paid to
participants being greater than  those  paid  to  individuals  in the  control group.  However, it would  be
premature to draw any conclusions on  the cost-effectiveness of these programs on the basis of so  little
evidence.
27In all, evaluations suggest that these programs work for only a small subset of the unemployed population
(generally  below  five  percent)  and  are  associated  with  high  deadweight  and  displacement  effects
rendering the  "net" effects of these programs to be quite  low.  The failure rate of these businesses  are
quite high in most cases (though businesses assisted through mentoring and business counseling are more
likely to succeed).  As in the case of training, assistance targeted at particular groups - in this case women
and older individuals - seems to have a greater likelihood of success.
E.  WAGES/EMPLOYMIENT  SUBSIDIES
We examine eighteen  interventions - one of which is experimental, 11 quasi-experimental and  six non-
scientific  (see  Appendix  5.7).  Along  with  micro-enterprise development,  wage/employment  subsidies
(WES) are among the  least funded active labor market programs in OECD countries.  In most OECD
countries, they attract less than 10 percent of expenditure on active labor market programs - in fact, in both
the U.S. and the U.K., funding for this program is negligible.  Eastern European countries generally put
greater emphasis on this intervention. In Hungary, expenditures on these subsidies account for 14 percent of
spending on ALMPs, while Poland expends 25 percent of its ALMP budget on these programs.
Wage  subsidy  programs  have  been  used for the  long-term  unemployed,  those  coming  from  severely
disadvantaged  areas  (e.g.  areas  with  high  unemployment),  and  youth.  They  aim  to  reduce  social
exclusion, that  is, to  help these individuals  regain contact with the world  of work.  They are  instituted
under  varying  economic  conditions  - in Australia  during  periods of falling  unemployment  in the mid
1980s (Mangan, 1988) as compared to Scotland where unemployment  rates rose from six to  10 percent
while the program was underway between 1989-1992 (NERA, 1995).18
WES typically is a payment to firms as a proportion of the wage in order to induce them to hire program
participants, but the  level and  duration  of these  subsidies  varies  significantly  between  programs  and
countries.  Thus, for  example, under the U.S. Targeted Job Tax credit, firms are paid 50 percent of the
individual's  wages  for a period of up to two years, while the  U.K. job  subsidy program provides  up to
100 percent of the wages (as well as paying for all training costs) for a period of six months.
Both  non-scientific  and  scientific evaluations tend  to  agree that  WES have high  deadweight  loss and
substitution  effects.  In  the  extreme  case  of  Ireland's  wage  subsidy  program,  the  deadweight  and
substitution losses combined totaled over 95 percent - alternatively, the net incrementality of the program
was  a meager  four percent  (OECD,  1993).  Belgium's  program  did not lag far  behind,  with the  net
employment  impact  of  only  10  percent (Fay,  1996).  Evaluations  of  similar  programs  in Australia,
Holland and the U.K. also indicate high deadweight and/or substitution effects (Table 5.4)
Equally disappointing are evaluations which compared wages and employment  outcomes of participants
with those  of a  control  group. For  example,  the  U.S. Targeted  Job Tax  Credit  program,  which  is a
longitudinal  study,  saw  earnings of  participants  significantly  higher  than  those  of  individuals  in the
18 In Japan, Employment  Adjustment  Grants  are a form of wage subsidies  which aim to lower unemployment  by extending
grants  to employers  who have offered  temporary  leave,  provided  education  and training,  or temporarily  transferred  employees  to
other companies  due to unavoidable  reductions in business activity attributable  to business fluctuations  and changes in the
industrial  structure.  These grants cover part of the costs for temporary leave allowances,  ordinary wages and wages for
transferred  employees. There grants are financed from the employment  security  fund which is accumulated  from employer
premiums.  However,  the effectiveness  of these  programs  has rarely  been evaluated.
28control group in the first year.  This effect declined in the second year and disappeared after that - not
surprisingly coinciding with the end of the subsidy when the employer  could fire the worker and  hire
another subsidized worker - thus maintaining a permanent subsidy (OECD, 1993).  Similarly, evaluation
results for Hungary show that participants were significantly less likely to be employed and earned less
(though not significantly so) than those in the control group (O' Leary, 1998(a)).
Box 53:  Quick Reemployment  Bonuses: An Alternative  to WES?
An interesting  variation of the wage subsidy intervention was tried  in the U.S.  in experiments  in four
states (Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania  and Washington) in the  1980s where  reemployment bonuses
were provided  to unemployed  workers  if they  could  find employment  within a  specified time  period
(Meyer,  1995).  For example, in Illinois, an unemployed individual would receive a bonus of $500 (four
times the average weekly unemployment insurance (UTI)  benefit) if they found employment within 11 weeks
of filing for U1 and kept the job for at least four months.  New Jersey's  bonus offer also had a four month
reemployment requirement, but had a 12 week qualification period and a bonus amount which decreased as
duration of unemployment increased.  Pennsylvania and Washington each conducted separate experiments
(11 in all).
Evaluations showed that unemployment spells fell in all four experiments, and there were no  significant
declines in reemployment  earnings. However, interestingly, in one treatment group in Illinois where the
bonus was provided to employers (in effect a wage subsidy), the impact on earnings was insignificant as
compared to the control group.
Due  to the  high  costs  of  the programs,  societal  benefits  varied.  They  were  positive  in  Illinois  and
Pennsylvania (slightly) but negative in New Jersey and Washington.  In 1994 and 1995, new mechanisms
for early identification of UTI  beneficiaries were implemented in order to provide aprofile for identifying
UI  beneficiaries  most  likely  to  exhaust  their  entitlements.  Simulations  suggest  that  targeting
reemployment  bonuses with profiling models  - targeting reemployment bonuses to claimants with high
exhaustion probabilities - may appreciably increase the cost-effectiveness of the bonus.
While  the  experiments  yielded  somewhat  positive  results,  evaluations  caution  against the  permanent
adoption of such bonuses as they are usually not cost-effective and end up generating losses for the UI
system.  However, some recent evidence suggests that profiling may  improve the cost-effectiveness  of
the bonuses.  A reemployment bonus also makes filing for UT  much more valuable,  as claimants become
eligible  for a large payment if they file and then find a job within a short period.  These effects may be
significant.
Source: Meyer (1995), OL'eary (1998(c))
One  exception  to  these  results  seems  to  be  the  U.S.  Job  Training  Partnership  act  program,  where
employers were provided subsidies to hire workers in conjunction with on-the-job training.  Evaluations of
this program show that single mothers who are AFDC recipients benefit significantly from these subsidies,
and males also benefited to some extent (Bloom, 1994).
29While  very  few  studies  carried  out  a  direct  cost-benefit  analysis, the  high  dead-weight  losses  and
substitution effects associated with this program strongly suggest that WES are unlikely to have positive
social returns in the way measured by economists, though they may contribute to some reduction in social
exclusion among older workers and single mothers.
Table 5.4
Effectiveness of Wage Subsidy Programs
Country  Deadweight and  Additionality (%)
Substitution Effects
(%)
Australia  in mid 1980s  (Jobstart  Deadweight=65%  35%
Program)
Belgium in  the early 1990s  Deadweight=53%  11%
(Recruitment  Subsidy)  Substitution=36%
England  1986-1990  (Training  and  Deadweight=69%  31  %
Employment  Grant)
England  late 1980s  (Workstart  I)  Deadweight=45%  25%
Substitution=30%
England  mid 1970s  (Small  Firms  Deadweight=70%  30%
Employment  Subsidy)
England  early 1980s  Deadweight=63%  27%
Substitution=10%
Germany  in  mid 1970s  (Wage  Deadweight-75%  25%
Subsidy  Scheme)
Ireland  in  the 1980's  (Employment  Deadweight=  70%  4%
Incentive  Scheme)  Substitution=2  1  %
Displacement=4%
Netherlands  during  early 1980s  Deadweight=25%  25%
(Vermeend-Moor  Act)  Substitution=50%
Netherlands  during  the late 1980s  Substitution  =80%.  20%
(JOB  scheme)
Scotland  1989-1992  (Employment  Deadweight=20%.  25%
Subsidy)  Substitution  and
Displacement=55%
U.S.  in mid 1980s  (Targeted  Job Tax  Deadweight-'70%  20%
Credit)  Substitution=  10%
Note:  Additionality is the net employment effect after accountingfor  deadweight,
displacement and substitution effects.
Source:  Summarizedfrom  Appendix 5.7
In summary, evidence indicates that these programs are unlikely to be effective; substantial deadweight
and substitution effects are associated with them.  Wage and employment  outcomes of participants are
also  generally negative as compared to a control group.  Careful targeting may be necessary to reduce
30substitution  and  deadweight  effects  - e.g.  unemployed  individuals  could  be  targeted  to  work  in
industries/occupations where there is excess demand.  However, individuals may not have requisite skills
that make them  attractive to  employers;  otherwise, they would  have been  hired  in the  absence of the
subsidy, too.  Further, controls are necessary in wage subsidy programs to ensure that firms do not misuse
this program.  Employers may refuse to hire the unemployed unless they  receive a large subsidy and, in
effect, use the program as a permnanent  subsidy to the workforce.  Monitoring of employer behavior is
thus necessary.
31VI.  CONCLUSIONS
In this study we have examined close to 100 impact evaluations (some of which are summaries of a group
of evaluations)  - both non-scientific  as well as scientific  - of active  labor market  programs  (training,
public  works,  microenterprise  development,  job  subsidies  and  job  search  assistance  schemes)  in  an
attempt to draw some lessons about the efficiency  and cost-effectiveness  of these  schemes (Table 6.1).
While the evidence covered  is probably not exhaustive, this  study has managed to  look at most of the
evidence available on different issues for these programs.
Table 6.1
Evaluations of Active Labor Market Programs
Type of Intervention  No.  of  Non-scientific  Experimental  Quasi-
Evaluations  experimental
Public Works  13  4  0  9
Job Search Assistance  18  1  6  11
Training
Long-term Unemployed  23  4  6  13
Laid offen  masse  11  5  0  6
Youth  7  0  5  2
MEDA  13  2  6  5
WES  1  5  8  4  3
Source:  Appendices  5.1-5.7
We should mention a few caveats that apply to the evaluations examined:
*  First, even in the most thorough  evaluations, issues relating to program design and implementation,
staffing  and  other  related  institutional  matters  (i.e. process  evaluations)  have  not been  evaluated.
These are important issues and will have an impact on the likelihood of the success of a program.
*  Second,  due  to  time  and  cost  considerations,  few  evaluations  are  longitudinal  in  nature.  They
therefore miss a crucial aspect of the program - its long-term impact.  Thus, for example,  questions
about  the  persistence  of effects  for  programs  that  are  successful  in  generating  employment  and
raising earnings in the short-run are rarely answered.
*  Third, cost-benefit evaluations usually fail to take into accountsavings  from placements of those who
obtain jobs  (e.g., direct  savings  from  reduced expenditures  on  unemployment  benefits  and  social
assistance  schemes  as well  as  indirect  savings  through  societal  benefits  such  as reduced  crime,
improved health outcomes etc.).
While the paucity of rigorous evidence on the costs  and effectiveness  of active labor market programs
does not allow a definitive conclusion as to whether such interventions can be justified economically, the
general conclusion is that large scale application of these programs should be avoided without knowledge
of their effects.  We draw the following general lessons from the experience  in OECD countries (lessons
for each program are summarized in Table 6.2).
Active labor market programs should take into account the general state of the economy and set the right
objectives and expectations.  One needs different programs if the cause of distress  in the labor market is a
cyclical  downturn or a  shock  or a systemic  transition:  in most  cases when  great  concern  for  labor is
present, the cause is demand deficiency rather than seasonal,  cyclical, frictional  or even structural (say,
lack of skills) factors (Sapsford and Tzannatos,  1993).  And expectations  should be modest: rarely can a
32program  meet the two  strict criteria of economic policy  (efficiency and distribution) and  also political
considerations at the same time.
Sound impact evaluation techniques  should be used to evaluate active labor market programs.  Relying
only on  non-scientific evaluations may  lead to incorrect policy conclusions.  A good  micro evaluation
compares labor market outcomes for individuals who have gone through a particular program with those
of  a  control group  of their  peers,  and  also  utilizes  data  on  program costs  to  attempt  to  answer the
following questions: (a) what are the impact estimates of the program on the individual; (b) are the impacts
large enough to yield net social gains; and (c) is this the best outcome that could have been achieved for the
money spent.
Table 6.2
Overview of Active Labor Programs
Program  Appear  to Help  Comments
I  Public Works  Severely  disadvantaged  Long-term  employment  prospects  not helped:  program
Programs/Public  groups  in providing  participants  are less likely  to be employed  in a normal  job and
Service  temporary  employment  earn less  than do individuals  in the control  group. Not a cost-
Employment  (13  and a safety  net.  effective  instrument  if objective  is to get people into  gainful
evaluations)  employment  after  program  completion.
2 Job-search  Adult unemployed  Relatively  more cost-effective  than other  labor  market
assistance/  generally  when economic  interventions  (e.g.  training)  - mainly  due to the lower  cost,  youth
Employment  conditions  are improving;  do not benefit  usually. Difficulty  lies in deciding  who needs  help
Services  (18  women  may benefit  more.  in order to minimize  deadweight  loss.
evaluations)
3. Training  of long-  Women  and other  These programs  are no more effective  than  job-search  assistance
tern unemployed  disadvantaged  groups  in increasing  re-employment  probabilities  and post-intervention
(23 evaluations)  generally  when economy  earnings  and are 2-4 times  more  costly. However,  job search
is improving,  assistance  may not be a direct substitute  as it may cater to a
different  groups  of the unemployed.
4. Retraining  in the  Little positive  impact  - These programs  are no more  effective  than  job-search  assistance
case of mass layoffs  mainly  when  economy  is  and significantly  more expensive.  Rate of return on these
(11 evaluations)  doing better.  programs  usually  negative.  However,  job search  assistance  may
not be a direct  substitute  as it may cater to a different  groups  of
the unemployed.
5. Training  for  No positive  impact.  Employment/eamings  prospects  not improved  as a result of going
youth (7  through  the training. Taking  costs into account  - the real rate  of
evaluations)  return of these  programs  both in  the short as well as the long run
is negative.
6. Micro-enterprise  Relativelv  older groups,  Very low  take-up rate  among  unemployed. Significant  failure
Development  the more educated.  rate of small  businesses. High deadweight  and displacement
Programs  (13  effects. High costs  - cost-benefit  analysis  rarely conducted  but
evaluations)  sometime  show overall  costs  to UI budget  higher  than  that  of the
control  group.
7. Employment/  Long-term  unemployed  in  Extremely  high deadweight  and substitution  effects. Impact
Wage  subsidies  (15  providing  an entry into the  analysis  shows  treatment  group  does not do well as compared  to
evaluations)  labor  force. However,  no  control. Sometimes  used by firms as a permanent  subsidy
long-term  impact.  program.
Source: Appendix  5.1-5.7
33Evaluations  show that it is extremely difficult to address problems of large scale unemployment through
active  labor  market  programs  - these  programs  may  work  for  specific  groups  under  specific
circumstances - hence, they have to be carefully targeted on the basis of evaluative evidence.  It is clear
that  programs that  work  for one  group  in  one  country  may  not work  for the  same group  in another
country.  It follows that these programs  should not be examined  in isolation, but in the context  of the
overall macro-framework as well as the institutional  labor market framework.
Evaluations  suggest that programs are generally  most effective when the economy is growing  and the
programs are well-targeted.  This is not surprising,  as labor demand is bound to be a crucial determinant
of the success of any ALMP.  However, even  under the best-case scenarios, payoffs are usually  modest
and cost-benefit  analysis suggest  that  social  rates of return  to effective  programs  are also  sometimes
negative.  Some  evidence  seems  to  suggest  that  programs  delivered  by  private  providers  are  more
effective than programs delivered by public providers or through NGOs
Finally, if a country  is going to  institute active labor market programs, then evidence tells us that they
should  start  off  with  modest  programs,  evaluate  these  programs  rigorously  using  sound,  scientific
evaluation techniques, and then tightly target these programs to those for whom they are found most cost-
effective.
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39Appendix  5.1
Public  Works  Schemes
Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Ongoinig  schemes in  Changing over time due to  Individuals placed in short-term  Quasi-  Displacement effect in  Long-term evaluation
Sweden to provide shor-t-  large tiinc period studied.  employment in the construction,  experimental  construction sector is  using data from 1976
terim1  employmiienit  and  healtlh  and welfare sectors.  69%.  Displacement  to 1990. At best,
safety net to the  effect in healthi  and  programs create no
uniemployed  (Forslund and  welfare is insignificant.  displacement.  No data
Kriueger,  1994)  on costs.  No evidence
on value of assets
created.
Providinlg  short-term  Unemploymiient  rate was  Individuals placed in short-term  Quasi-  P  ositive impact on
employmiienit  to the  fairly steady between 3-  employment.  experimental  subsequent employment
unlemployed  in Austria in  4%.  and income levels
the early 1990s  (Meager  compared with control
and Evans, 1998)  group.
Short-terimi  employment  Denmark spent about  Individuals provided with shiort-  Non-scientific  Likelihood of leaving  Participants finding
provided to the  0.2% of GDP on these  term employment as well as  unemployment peaks  subsequent jobs kept
disadvantaged in Denmar  k  programs.  Unemployment  subsidized  jobs.  after participation in  them longer than non-
in the late 1980s (Meager  rate around 7%  temporary jobs.  participants.
and Evans, 1998)  I-lowever  such effects
are not strong enough to
compensate for reduced
employment impact
during period of scheme.
Unemployed individuals  Unemilploylmienit  ratcs over  Various tempor-ary  employmenit  Quasi-  After controlling for  If these differences
provided  short-term  i 5 percent. Expenditurle  schemes provided.  experimenltal  unobser  ved differences,  were not controlled
employmilenit  in  Ireland in  on these programs rose  short-tenn and long-  for, the short-term and
the mid 1980s  (Breen,  fiom 0.09% of GDP in the  term impacts on  long-term employment
1991)  mid 1980's to 0.25% by  employment are not  impacts are positive.
1990.  significait.
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Public  Works  Schemes
Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Unemployed individuals  Unemploymilent  rates rose  Employment  Action programs.  Quasi-  Reduced probability of getting
provided temporary  from 7% in 1990  to over 10%  experimental  a job after one year (by one
employment in the U.K. in  in 1993.  percent), increased  probability
the early 1  990s  after three years (by 4%)
Individuals  provided  I'ime  period not known  Public  works relief program  Quasi-  Participants  more likely to  Some selection bias
temporary employment in  experimental  remain in unemployment  as  likely.
Sweden  (Meager and  compared to non-participants
Evans, 1998)
Ongoing schemes in  Changing  over time due to  Youths placed in short-term  Quasi-  Displacement  effect is 100%.  - Long-term  evaluation
Sweden  to provide short-  large time period  studied.  etnployment  in different sectors  of  experimental  a one percent increase  through  using data fiom 1976  to
term employment and  the economy.  job creation schemes leads to a  1990.  No data on costs.
safety net to the young  one percent decline in regular  No evidence  on value of
unenmployed  (Skedinger,  youth employment.  assets created.
1995)
Provide  employment for  Unemployment  rates at  Adults unemployed  over a year and  Non-  Positive short-term  effect but  Participants  became
long-term unemployed  around 5% and rising. Finland  youth unemployed over three  scientific  increased  re-inflow into  unemployed once again
adults and short-tenn  spends about 0.4 percent of its  months placed in public work  unlemployment  in the longer  after the program was
unemployed  youth in  GDP on public works  schemes.  term.  completed.
Finland  in 1987 (OECD,  schemes -more than on any
1993)  othel-  active labor programs.
Aid unemployed gain  Unemployment rates were  NA  Non-  Significant increases  in flow  Participants  became
short-ternm  employment in  steady in Germany at around  scientific  out of short-term  unemployed once again
Germany during 1987 and  7%.  unemployment. However no  after the program was
1988  (OECD, 1993).  significant impact on long-term  completed.
unemployment.
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Public  Works  Schemes
Labor Market Problem  Relevant  Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Provide employmilent  for  Unemploymiienit  rates fell from  Long-term  unemployed  Non-  Deadweight effect=15%  and
the long-term unlemployed  about 13 percent in the early  provided  permanent  jobs in the  scientific  substitution  effect=15%
in Ilolland in the late  1980s  to below 10 percent by the  municipal  governments.
1980's (OECD, 1993)  endl  of thie  decade.  I olland spent
less than 0.02 percetnt  of GDP on
these programs.
Aid displaced and long-  Employmcnt had fallen by over  Individuials  employed in public  Quasi-  Matchied  pairs estimates show  Evaluation done in three
ternm  unemployed workers  20% dur ing 1989-92.  service employmenit  i.ncluding  experimental  that, as compared to a control  counties. Using cost
to gain temporary  UJnemploymenit  rate r  ose from 0.5  maintenance  of public  group, participants  are 50% less  data along with
employment in Hunigary  in  in 1989  to 8% by 1992.  facilities,  assistance  to social  likely  to be in a normal job after  effectiveness  data shows
1992-93  (O'Leary, 1995)  welfare agencies.  participating  in these programs.  that these programs  are
Earnings are not significantly  extremely cost-
different though.  ineffective.
Assist displaced and long-  Sharp rise in unemployment:  from  Individuals  employed in public  Quasi-  After participating  in the  Evaluation done in 10
term unemployed workers  below one percent at the turn of  service employment including  experimental  program, individuals  are 29%  counties. Using cost data
to gain temporary  the decade to 12 percent by 1994.  maintenance  of public  less likely to be employed in a  along with effectiveness
employment in H-lungary  in  After falling continuotisly  for five  facilities,  assistance  to social  nonlal job and earn $15/month  data shows that these
the mid 1990s  (O'Leary,  years, real GDP started growing  welfare agencies.  less than those in the control  programs are extremely
1998(a))  slowly. Of spending on active  group.  cost-ineffective.
programs - 15  percent spent on
public works.
Aid displaced and long-  GDP started  growing slowly from  Individuals  employed on  Quasi-  After participating  in the  Evaluations done in 8
term unernployed  workers  1994 but untemilployment  rate rose  projects  organized by  experimental  program, individuals  are 8%  Polish voivods. Using
to gain temporary  fiom 0% in 1989  to 16% by 1994,  government  agencies including  less likely to be employed in a  cost data along with
employment in Ploland(l  in  thoughi  it has (leclined  since. In  minicipal governments.  nornal job.  No significant  effectiveness  data shows
the mid 1990s  (O'Leary,  1994,  35% of expenditures  on  difference in earnings.  that these programs  are
1998(b))  active labor programs  were  cost-ineffective.
expended on public works.
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Job Search  Assistance
Labor Market Problem  Relevant  Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Help place job seekers  Unemployment remained  Canada's National Employment  Non-scientific  No measurable  impact of  72 districts  suiveyed. Job
through counseling  high but fell steadily from  Service  assists individuals  (not  agency on employment in the  search services considered  to
assistance  in Canada  12% in 1983 to 10% in 1987.  necessarily unemployed)  in  labor market  at large, nor on  have improved equity as the
during mnid  1980s  (OECD,  finding  jobs.  job-finding for persons  whose  most disadvantaged  benefited
1993)  general situation was  more.
relatively good. However, a
relatively positive impact in
communities  that were the
hardest hit.
Help place job seekers  Tine  period not known  NA  Quasi-  Positive impact on subsequent  Follow-Up  conducted up to
throughl  counselinig  in  experimental  employment and income  two years after program
Austria (Meager and  levels as compared to  participation.
Evans, 1998)  controls.
Job seekers provided  job  Time period not knowin  Public  employment  services  Experimenital  Participanits  1  1% more likely
search  assistance in  provided  intensified  job search  to be employed as compared
Sweden  (Meager and  assistance  through counseling  to control group and also
Evans, 1998)  and interviews.  earning higher wages.
Help unemploymenit  Proportion  of long-term  U.K. Restart Program. Benefit  Experimental  Different evaluationis  point  to  Net impact not clear as many
benefit  claimanits  get  untemployed  in total  claimants interviewed  assistance  positive short run impacts  exits were not into
information  on  unemployed declined  from  given every six months to  (treatment group found  unsubsidized  jobs but into
employmenlt  or migrate  to  about 45% to 30%.  provide  positive  hielp  and also  employment 55 days quicker  other government  subsidized
other  programs in the U.K.  Unemnployment  rates fell  act as a gateway  to other  on average). Long-tern  programs. Likelihood of
in late 1980s  (Meager and  from 12% in 1986  to 6% in  government  schemes.  effects are weaker withi  ranldomizationi  bias.
Evans, 1998)  1990. 0.1  % of GDP spent on  Attendance  compulsory,  with  participants  no more likcly  to
these measLires.  sanctions imposed  on  get stable jobs (as compared
individuals  not deemed  to be  to control).
actively  seeking  work.
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Job Search  Assistance
Labor Market Problem  Relevant  Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Unemploymenlt  insurance  Individuals  provided  job  Quasi-  Farnings gains lasted for up to
claimants,  particular  ly  search assistance  with the  experimenital  three to four years, but
single motlhets  provided  threat of compulsory uLipaid  paiticipants  did not enjoy
job searchi  assistance in the  work expericnce.  greater  job security  than
U.S. in the late 1980's  contr-ol  group.
(Balakrishlian,  1998)
Long term unetimployed  Propor-tion  of long-term  Individuals  unemiiployed  and  Experimental  Likelihood  of findinig  work  Tiue effects may be
provided  job counlselilng  il  unemployed in total  claiming unlemploymenlt  improved but may come at  understated as 25% of the
U.K. in the late 1  980s  ullemilployed  declined from  benefits for at least six moniths  the expense of those who are  control group were also
(OECD, 1993;  Jackman  about 45% to 30%.  provided  job counseling.  the shiort-term  unemployed.  provided some  job
and l.ehmann, 1990)  Unemployment rates fell  counseling.
from 12% in 1986 to 6% in
1990. 0.1%ofGDP  spent on
these measures.
IProvide  job counseling and  Unemployment rates  Clients of AFDC  (Assistance  Experimental  Significant  impact on  Program is less usefild  for
searcih  assistance  to women  remained between 6-7% in  for Families with Dependent  employment  and earnings.  those with recent work
on welfare  to get jobs in  the U.S..  0.08% of GDP  Children) - mostly lone  Participants  4% more likely  to  experience as well as those
the U.S. in the mid 1980s  spent on these programs.  mothers - were provided  job  be employed and earn over  who had been on welfare for
(Gueron,  1990)  counseling  and job search  20% more.  a long time.
workshops and (in some cases)
some work experience
Individuals in Australia  Unemployment rates in  Individuals  are assisted  in  Quasi-  Participants  were II percent  Evaluation done I year after
assisted  in their job searchl  Australia  were risinig  to over  rcsuimiie  wr  itinig  anid  experimnenital  morc likely to be employed.  individuals  had entered job
thiougig  job clibs in 1992  1 )% over this perio(l.  interviewinig  techliniquies  as well  I'his service was more  club. Those who had gone
(Fey, 1996)  Austr  alia spent about 0.09%  as practical matters -provision  beneficial for less  educated  throuigh  other labor market
of GDP on these  measur-es  in  of stationery,  postage  etc.  males,  intervenitionis  prior to joininig
1992.  in the job club did not benefit.
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Job Search  Assistance
Labor  Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Assisting  individuals laid  After ycars of decline, a  The Industrial Adjustment  Quasi-  Those who availed  of the  Program hindered clients in
off as a result of industrial  sharp r  ise in unemployment  Scrvice. Job counseling  experimental  service spent more time  their job search withi  no
restructur-inIg  in Canada  durinig  this period firom  8%  provided  to those laid off en  searclinig  for  jobs (12 weeks)  positive benefits.
1989-1991  (Fay, 1996)  to 11%.  By 1990-91,  Canada  imiasse.  Other services  e.g.  and lost income ($7200).
was spendinlg  about 0.2% of  retraining  were also provided.
GDP of employmilenit  services
and their administration.
Assisting  youth in  After years of decline, a  Job search assistance  among a  Quasi-  No impact on raising  Program did have a positive
increasing  their  sharp rise in unemilployment  variety of services  provided  to  experimental  probability  of employment or  impact in raising education
employability  in Canada  during this period from 8%  help disadvantaged  students in  earnings or participants  as  level of participants  (0.3
1989-1992  (Fey, 1996).  to I 1%. Youth  their school to work transition.  compared to control group.  years).
unemployment  rose from
12% to 16% during this
period.
Assisting long-term Dutch  Unemployment  rates falling  Persons who had been  Quasi-  Small improvement  in  No information available on
ullemployed  through job  steadily from 8% to 5%  interviewed  for three years or  experimental  probability  of employment (2-  earnings gain.
counseling services in the  during this period.  more were given job  3%).
mid to late 1980s  (OECD,  reorientation
1993)  interviews/couniseling.
Scheme to help youth find  Unemployment  had fallen  Provision of counseling  and  Quasi-  No impact on the probability  Program did not have any
employment  in Holland in  from 9% in the mid 1980s  to  job search assistance  for school  experimental  of findinig  ajob or increasing  impact on likelihood  of
the early 1  990s (Fey, 1996)  6% by 1991  but rose again to  leavers upto 20 years old.  earnings for the treatment  participants  enteritng
9% by 1994.  Youth  group as compared to the  education or training either.
unemployment  remained  control group.
fairly steady at around 11%
during this period.
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Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Schcme to help youth find  Unemploymiienit  had fallen  Provision  of counseling  and  Quasi-  Counseling  offered  to youtil  No inforimiatiotn  on earnings
eimploymilent  in I  Holland in  from 9% in the mid 1980s to  job search assistance  for school  experimental  had little impact on job  gain for participants.
thc early 1990s  (Fey, 1996)  6% by 1991 buti ose again to  leavers  upto 20 years old  chances. Temporaryjob
9% by 1994. Youth  followed  by subsidized  placement (subsidized  by
unemployment  remained  temporary  work.  government)appeared  to lead
fairly steady at around 11%  to regular employment  gaiis
duLrig this period.  of 20%.
Assisting the very long  Over 30% of tile  For individuals  employed for  Quasi-  A moderate increase  in full-  Evaluationi  done five montihs
ter-im  unem)ployed  gain  unlemployed  (10% of labor  at least  two years. Consisted  experimenital  time work (5%).  after individuals  joined
employmtieint  in New  force) are long-term  of four elements: a job  program. No informationi  on
Zealand in 1994  (NZ DOL,  unemployed.  screening interview,  a one  wage gain of participants
1995)  U]nemilploymilenit  rates were  week workshiop,  a follow up  relative  to control.
fairly steady. Expenditures  interview  and case
on thcse programs were  managemeit.
about 0.12% of GDP.
Assisting AFDC  Unemployment rates  Participants  -mnainly  women  Experimental  Participants  earn 4% more  Cost of training and job-
(Assistance  to Families  remained between 6-7% in  with young children -provided  than the control group.  search assistance  combined is
with Dependent  Childreni)  the U.S..  0.08% of GDP  trainiing  in various skills. They  $16,250 per recipient (most of
participants  gain  spent on these programs.  also attend job searcil clubs for  the cost is for training),
employable  skills in the  two weeks and then search for  making the program highly
U.S. il the 1980s  jobs.  cost-ineffective.
(Heckman, 1994)
Get people off  Unemliploymilenit  rates  Vayinig lengthi  job searcih  Experimental  Significant  decline in number  Experiments  lasted from 6-12
unecimip  loymcnt benefits  rein-ei  a icd  between 6-7% in  seminars. The  sem  ioiar-s  anid  of weeks of unemilploytimenit  motithis  after whichi  evaluatio
and into  employment in  the l.S..  0.08% of (Dl)P  personial  visits with job searchi  bonis claimed (between  one  was conducted. Cost-benefit
Charleston,  New Jersey,  spent on these programs.  counselors  exceed  that of the  and four weeks). Slight  analysis tend to show that the
Washington,  Nevada and  control group.  increase  in re-emiiploymenit  Ul system bemiefited  fiom
Wisconisini  in the 1970s  and  earninlgs.  these intervenitionis.
tile 1980s  (Meyer, 1995)
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Labor  Market Problem  Relevant  Iiidicators  Intervenitioni  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Job search assistance  Sharp rise in unemployment:  UJnemployed  provided  a full  Quasi-  Participants  seven percent  Evaliation done in 10
provided  to the  fiom below one percent at  r  ange of placement  services  experimental  more likely  to be employed.  counties.  No significant
uniemlployed  in Hungary in  the tiril of the decade to 12  including  job referrals,  However,  no impact on  difference in duration or
the mid 1990s  (O'Leary,  percent by 1994. After  counseling,  skills assessment,  earnings. Women  benefit  amount of unemployinent
1998(a))  falling continuously  for five  job search training,  resume  more thanl  men.  benefits received.
years, real (iDP started  preparation  and job clubs.
growinlg  slowly.  1-lungar-y
spent 0.15% of GDP on
these programs.
Job search assistance  GDP started  growinig  slowly  Unemployed  provided a full  Quasi-  Participants  are 15% more  Evaluation done in 8 counties.
provided  to the  from 1994  but  range of placement  services  experimental  likely to be employed than  Treatment group was
unlemiiployed  in Poland in  unemployment  r  ate rose  including  job referrals,  control group. They earn  unemployed for almost 0.5
the mid 1990s  (O'Leary,  from 0% in 1989 to 16% by  counseling,  skills assessment,  about $5 month more  months more and drew $24
1998(a))  1994,  though it has declined  job search training,  resume  (significant).  Women benefit  more in unemployment
since.  Poland spent 0.01%  preparation  and job clubs.  more than men.  compensation  than control
of GDP on these programs.  group
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Training  for the  Long-term  Unemployed
Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Inprovinig skills and thus  Unemploymenit  rates fell in  Training provided hands on  Non-scientific  In 1991, 82 individuals were  Training was quite expensive
provide better access to  Ilolland since thc mid 1980's  experience through a  enrolled in the course.  52  as annual funding of the
jobs for tlhe  long-terimi  and were arounid  7 percenit  in  simulated workshop.  completed and 41 went onto  program was about
uLlemilployed  in 'I'ilburg,  1992.  Emphasis was placed on  a job or further education.  $7,500,000 ($ 10,000  per
Nethcllanids  since the  technical skill developincnt  Metal works program is the  trainee).
carly 1980's (OECD,  as well as well as instilling  most successful in placing
1993a).  good work habits.  Four  students.
main skill areas were: metal
training, wood trainiing,
installationi  techniques and
clothing.  Courses ran from
4-10 months.
I ligh regional  In 23 of the 142 regions in  Among other interventions,  Non-scientific  Training reduced  In light of the extremely higi
unlemploylmlelnt  levels in  Germany unlemployment  training and retraining of  unemployment somewhat.  cost of training (around $500
Germtiany  in the late 1970s  levels were above 6 percenit.  unemployed in firms were  However it is estimated that  million for training and other
(OECD, 1991),  Some firimis  in this regioln  provided. The firms wlho  by 1981, over 40 percent of  interventionis),  results are
were also facing serious  employed these trainees  the hard-to place individuals  very disappointing. No data
problems in ad justing to  received a wage subsidy of  had already left their jobs.  on wages.
economic chaniges.  90 percenit  of wages for 24
months.
Provisioni  of skills to the  Australia's unemployment  rate  Individuals provided with  Quasi-  Individuals 12 percent more  There is a possible selection
unemployed in Australia  was declining from 8% in  classroom and on-the-job  Experimental  likely to be employed than  bias in this study.  Training
in the late 1980s and early  1986  to 6% in 1988  but then  training  control group.  However,  is less effective than other
1990s through the Jobtrain  rose sharply again to around  impact dissipated rapidly - interventions - e.g. job clubs.
programn  (McIagcr  and  10% by 1991.  after five months  No evidence on program
Evans,  1998)  unemploycd participants  costs.
were as likely to find job as
individuals in control group.
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Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Training provided to the  Ireland had the highest  Various short-term  Quasi-  Participants are more likely  If unobservable
unemployed in Ireland in  unrenployment rate among  trainin1g  measures  experimental  to be employed in short-  characteristic differences
the mid 1980s (Breeni  the OECD countries during  provided to the  term (16%).  Aftcr one year,  are controlled for,
1991)  this period (averaginig  about  unlemployed.  participants only 7% more  participants no more likely
15%)  likely to be employed.  to be employed.
Traininig  provided to the  Time period not known.  Labor market training  Quasi-  Short-term positive impact  Gains dissipate over time.
ullemployed  to enhance  provided to the  experimenital  on earnings - 3% hiigher
their skills in Sweden  oniemployed.  than control group after six
(Meager and Evans, 1998)  months; hiowever,  long-terin
impact is somewhat
negative (after two years).
Unemployed individuals  Time period not known.  Employment Training on-  Quasi-  Significanitly  increased
provided with traininlg  to  the-job  experimental  probability of getting a job
enhance skills in the U.K.  by 3% after a year and 22%
(Meager and Evans, 1998)  after 3 years.
Provision of skills to long  A decline in petrochemical  Texas WAD project.  Experimental  By end of first year after  Despite high costs of
terml  unemployed workers  industry led to layoff of  Displaced workers were  participation, no additional  classroom training (twice as
in Houston, Texas (1983-  workers.  In the U.S.,  provided with JSA or a  earning gain accrued from  much as JSA) no additional
85). Individuals eligible  unemploymenit  rates declined  mixture of JSA with  classroom training as  gains accrued from this type
were unlemploymenit  from 9.5 percent in 1983 to  classroom training.  compared to the JSA only  of training.
henefit recipients who had  7.4 percent in 1985 (and  sample.
a low probability of  maintained this trend till the
returning to their previous  late 1980s). Employment in
occupation or industry  this industry increased
(Bloom, 1990).  slightly between 1983 and
1985
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Labor Market  Relevant Indicators  Intervention Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Problem  Evaluation
Provision  of skills to  In the U.S., unlemiploymlient  Texas WAD project.  Experimental  By end of first year after  Increase in earnings for
long term-i  unemployed  rates declined from 9.5 percenit  Displaced workers were  participation, while this  women slightly exceeded
workers in El Paso,  in 1983 to 7.4 percent in 1985  provided with JSA or a  program had no effect on  program costs. However no
TIexas  (1983-85).  (and maintained this trend till  mixture of JSA with  male earnings it had a positive  beneficial effects for males.
(Criteria same as above).  the late 1980s). Employment in  classroom training.  effect on increasing earnings
Workers laid off from  manufacturing fell by close to 2  for women.
light m  alnufacturing  percent between 1982 and 1983
plauts (Bloom, 1990).  but rose by about 5 percenit  till
1985.
I lelp the long term  Unemployment rates in the  New Jersey Ul Re-  Experimental  Focusinig  only on those who  Tl  he tollowing caveats apply
unenmployed  in New  U.S. fell from 7.1 percent in  employment Demonstrationi  undertook training, over 10  - these results may not
J.ersey  find cmployment  1985 to 6.1 percent by 1987.  project.  Displaced workers  quarters after the program,  apply for a random group of
(1986-87).  In general,  While employment in  were provided with a  both CT and OJT significanitly  claimants; only 15 percent
the unemployed were  manufacturing remnained  fairly  mixture of JSA, JSA  increased earnings relative to  of those offered trainintg
laid off from  steady between 1  985 and 1988,  followed by on-the-job  JSA recipients only.  These  accepted it; training
manufacturing, trade  trade employment increased by  training (OJT), JSA followed  individuals were also  benefited those who already
and services (Corson et.  7 percent and that in services  by classroom  training (CT)  employed for greater amounts  possessed marketable skills.
al., 1989; Andersoni,  by about 5 percent over this  or JSA followed by re-  of time/quarter as compared  Cost-benefit analysis show
Corson and Decker,  tine  period.  employment bonus.  to the JSA-only group.  that costs exceed  expected
1991).  benefits.
Increase thc  As compared to the U.S.,  The  job development  Quasi-  Employability of women goes  In view of high program
employability and  unemployment rates have been  program has been in  experimetntal  up while that of males  cost (around
earninigs  of the long  fairly highi  in Canada. I-lowever  operation since 1985.  declines.  Weekly earnings for  $9300/participant) training
term unemployed in  they declinied  from I i .2 percent  Formal and on-the-job  females are insignificant  is not cost effective,
Canada.  (Goss, Gilroy  in the mid 1980s to 7.5 percent  training are provided to tlhe  relative to control group while  especially for men.
et. al., 1989).  in 1989. Spuired by a growth of  unemployed. Wages and  they are lower for males.
commercc and services,  direct cost of classroom
employmenit  grew by about 3  training are subsidized. The
percent annually over the time  wage subsidy helps
period.  employers cover the cost of
on the job training.
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Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Assist individuals either  Unemploymenit  rates  Training individuals to be  Non-scientific  Results measured in terms of  No data on cost available.
at the risk of becoming  r  emained fairly steady at  certifiable in one of the  retention rates (those who  Dropout froni employment
unemployed or those who  just over 10 percent in the  375 apprenticeable trades.  complete the course); pass  was fairly high -two years
were unemployed in  early 1980s.  The program took up to  rate (those who pass exam);  after completing training
Germany in the early  two years. Contents and  and employment rate (those  only 60 percent of men and
1980s (Johanson, 1994).  specification of retraining  who find jobs in occupations  66 percent of women were
corresponded to those of  for which they are retrained).  still employed.
initial vocational  training.  T hese rates were 70%, 85%
and 90% respectively. Thus
the overall success rate was
54 percent. Employment
rates varied by age - for
those over 45 unemployed
over a year it was below 50
percent while for those 25-35
it was 86 percent.
Individuals at the r isk of  Uneinploymenit  rates were  This is an evaluation of  Quasi-  No type of training has any  No information on wages or
being unemployed in  steady in Germany between  four programs, two of  experimental  significant impact on the  costs of training is available.
1987-1988 in Germany  1986 and 1988.  They fell  whichi  are training (one  flows out of short-terim  or
(Johanson, 1994b)  somewhat by 1990.  offering further training  long-term unemployment nor
Employment grew at  for employed and  on the flows into
slightly over I percent  unemployed individuals  unemployment.
during this period.  while the othier  offered
retraining for the
unemployed).
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Training  for the  Long-tcrm  Uneniployed
Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention Design  Type of  Result  Clomments
Evaluation
Aid long-teriml  untemnployed  Unemiiploymiletit  rates in  The Trade Adjustnent  Quasi-  Individuals who received  Analysis was only done for
workers in the U.S. to find  the U.S. fell from 7.1  Assistance Program was  experimental  training began earning  the manufacturing industry.
jobs (1988).  Most workers  percent in 1985 to 6.1  intetided to develop skills in  significantly more (as  While investment in
were been laid off due to a  percent by 1987. While  occupations different from  compared to those who  training may have been
plant closing (Leigh, 1992).  employment in  occupations in pre-  received extended incomne-  effective in increasiig
manlfacturing remained  displacement  jobs.  Most of  maintenanice  benefits) by the  earnings,  the training was
fairly steady between  these skills were supplied by  6th quarter and this difference  costly (each trainiee  was
1985 and 1988,  trade  a vocational college or local  continued to increase till the  given a $12000 training
employment increased  community college in  12th (last) quarter reaching  voucher).
by 7 percent and that in  courses that were over a year  $500 per qtiarter.
services by about 5  long.
percent over this time
period.
Assist long term unemployed  Unemnploymnent  rates fell  Long-term AFDC recipients  Experimental  On average, participants  Cost of program over
and welfare recipients gain  sharply in the U.S.  and ex-offenders  were  earned $420 more/annum than  $13,400 per participant.
employment in the U.S.  between 1975 and 1978.  provided training as well as  control group a year after  Hence, real rate of return
between 1975-78  government-subsidized  work  participating in the program.  even if mean effect lasted
(Friedlanidet, 1997)  experience in enterprises in  10 years was negative.
this demonstration project.
Between the early 1960s  and  'I'ime period too long.  P'articipants  provided with  Quasi-  On average, male participants  Evaluation done two years
thei  mid 1970s,  classroom training and on-  experimental  earned $150 more per annum  after participation. Cost of
disadvantaged adults  the-job training.  as compared to control group.  training per participant was
provided with training to  over $6000.  If mean effect
enhance employability in the  lasts 10 years, real rate of
U.S. (Bloom, 1984)  ieturnl  will still be negativc.
52Appendix  5.3  (continued)
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Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Interventioin  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
I  lelp disadvantaged and  After falling in the late 1970s,  Participants provided with  Quasi-  Males earned significantly  Evaluation done two years
long-terlm  unemiiployed  unemployment rates rose to  on the job training,  experimental  less (over $500/annum)  after participation. Cost of
adults gain employment  10% by 1982.  classroom traiing,  compared to control group.  training about
between 1974 and 1983  government subsidized work  However, women earned  $9000/participant. If
in U.S. under the  experience as well as public  $1800/annum more.  effects persist for 10 years,
Comprehensive  service employment (public  rates of return will remain
Employnment  and  works programs).  negative for males.
Training Act (CETA)  However positive rate of
(Friedlander et. al., 1997)  return (15%) for women.
I lelp disadvanitaged  Time period too long.  National in scope.  Experimental  Both men and women  Evaluation done two years
adults gain employable  Participants provided with  increased earnings  after participation. Cost of
skills in the U.S. 1983-  classroom traininlg  and on-  significantly (close to  training was around $1200.
present unider  the Job  the-job training.  $1  000/ann1umi).  Very higlh  rate of returm  for
T  raining Placement Act  both men and women (over
(JTPA) (Friedlander, et.  50%) if effect persists for




I lelp miniority  women  There was a shar  p decline in  Demonstrationi  program  Experimental  Participating women earned  Evaluation done two years
gain skills under the  the unemployment rate from  under which participants  (all  over $700/annum more on  after participation.  Training
Minority Female Single  9.5% to just over 5% durinig  womnen)  were provided  average than non-participating  was fairly expensive
Parenit  (MFSP) program  this time period.  classroom training as well as  women. However, this effect  ($6,000/participant) and
between 1982-1988 in the  on-the-job training.  is not significant.  hence in the short-run real
U.S. (Friedlander et. al.,  rate of returni  was negative.
1997).  However, slightly positive
rates of return if effect
persists at least 10 years.
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Training  for the  Long-term  Unemployed
Labor Market  Relevant Indicators  Intervention Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Problem  Evaluation
I lelp long term  iHigh  uLnemployment  rates  Comiiimunity  program.  Non-scientific  Little impact on flows fiom  Cost-effectiveness of these
uelmiiiployed  and  (around 10-1  1 percent)  'I'argeted vocational training  long-term unemployment.  programs was likely to be
displaced workers gain  persisted thiougil muchi  of the  was provided by local  negative.
cmploymcnt in Einglandl  1980s.  Between 1983 and  authorities in conjunction
in 1980's  (Addison and  1990 employmilenit  has r isen by  with local colleges, central




I lelp adult uLnemllployed  tJenemploymenlt  rates fell from  Centers for adult vocational  Quasi-  Unemployed persons who  No data is available on
and displaced workers  about 13 percent in the early  training provided training to  Experimental  did not undergo training  wages and costs.
gain better employmiienit  1980s to below 10 percent by  these workers.  found jobs as quickly as  However, in terms of
opportunities thlroughl  the end of thc decade.  those who did.  Even two  employability, training
access to training in  years down the line the  seems to have been
Holland (OECD,  employment situation for  ineffective.
1994c).  the two groups was not
significantly differenit.
Assist unlemploycd  and at  Employmenit  had fallen by over  Largely classroom  based-  Quasi-  Training raises the  Training costs are
risk workers gain skills to  20% during  1989-92.  instruction  experimental  probability  of findinig  $900/participant. It would
become more  Uncmploymilenit  rate rose fiom  employment  by six percent.  take over 30 years to
employable in Hungar  y  0.5 in 1989  to 8% by 1992.  Earninigs  of participants  no  recover costs of program
in the early 1  990s  hiigher  thani  those of the  based on reasonable
(O'Leary, 1995;  Gill and  control group.  assumptions about the
Dar, 1995).  durability of program
effects.
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Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention Design  Typevof  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Assist displaced and long-  Sharp rise in unemployment:  On the job skills training.  Quasi-  Trainees 10% more likely  to be  Evaluation done in 10
term unemployed workers  from below one percent at the  Participants  receive  a stipend  experimental  employed than the comparison  counties. These results
to gain skills in Hungary  turn of the decade to 12 percent  that has a 10%  premium over  group and earn significantly  pertaini  to individual
in 1996 (O'Leary,  by 1994. After falling  the unemployment  . more. Women perform  retraining and not group
1998(a))  continuously  for five years, r  eal  compensation  benefit.  significantly  better than men.  retraining. No cost-benefit
GDP started  growing slowly.  analysis.
Aid displaced  and long-  GDP started growing slowly  On the job skills training.  Quasi-  Trainees are 10% more likely  Evaluations done in 8 Polish
term unemployed workers  from 1994  but unemployment  Participants  receive  a stipend  experimental  to be employed and earn more  voivods. From a societal
to gain skills in Poland in  rate rose fiom 0% in 1989  to  that has a 15% premium over  than the comparison  group.  perspective,  training is not
the mid 1  990s (O'Leary,  16%  by 1994,  thoughi  it has  the unemployment  Women benefit more than  cost effective (net benefit to
1998(b))  declined since.  compensation  benefit.  men.  I'rainces have reccived  society is -140 dollars).
close to $40 more in
unemployment  compensation
than the control group.
55Appendix  5.4
Retraininig in Cases  of Plant Closures  & Mass  Layoffs
Labor Market  Relevant Indicators  litervcntion Design  Type of  Result  Coniments
Problem  Evaluation
Ford Plant ClosuL-e  A 25 percent declinie  in auto  Basic skills training as well as  Non-scientific  I-ligh  success rate in  Causes for perceived success
in San Jose, U.S.  produIctionl  between 1978  andt  targeted vocational  traininig  in  placement.  were - adequate resource base
(1982). 2400  1980. Unemployment rates in  marketable skills.  ($6000 grant/worker);  high
workers lost their  the U.S. rose from 7.5 percent in  degree of coordination  and
jobs (OECD, 1993a)  1981 to 9.5 percent in 1982  and  assistance provided by Ford
1983 andc manufacturing  and government.
employment declinied  by 5
percent duirinig  1981-83.
Shipyard  closure in  High unlemilploymenlt  rates in  Program in training women  Non-scienitific  51 businesses  were set  This progratn did not seem to
Storstrom county,  regiois, especially  among  entrepreneurs  ( 1986-89)  to help  up by 1989. Less than  have met with muchl  success
Dienmark  (1986).  women. National  them start their own business. A  a third of participants  and was apparently quite
2000 people lost  uiieniployment  rates for men in  total of 200 houirs  of introductory  opened uip  a full-time  costly (precise cost estimates
their jobs (OLCD,  1986  and 1987  were 6.1 and 6.4  and specific business  oriented  business and few hired  unavailable).
1  993a).  per  cent respectively while the  training were provided.  any employees,  thus
corresponding  numbers for  generating low
women were 10.0  and 9.6  additional
percent. F.mployment  in  employment.
maniufacturing  remained
stagnanit  since the mid 1980s.
Steel and Coal plant  Contracting  steel sector. In  Workers received 70 percent of their  Non-scientific  High success rate in  No evidence of long term
closure in Creusot-  mininig  industry, cmployment  forner salaries for 10 months during  placement.  employment impact of
Loire, France  has fallcn steadily throughout  which they participated  in retraining  program participation.
(1984). 1230 people  the 1980s  - by close to 40  and job-search activities  after which
becamne  uLniciiployed  percent between 1980 and 1990.  thiey  wcre promised  re-employmncit
almost immediately  UJinemploymcint  rates rose tiom  in differenit  firimis  in thic  regioni.
(OECD, 1  993a).  8.1 perccit in 1982  to 10.2  Traininig  was provided in
percent by 1985.  enginieering  courses, plastic molding,
ManulfactUring  employment fell  refrigeration  etc., Financial
by about 6 percent between  incentives  were provided  to firms  to
1983  and 1985.  hirc these workers.
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Labor Market  Relevant liidicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Problem_  Evaluation
Closure of Pulp planit  I Jnemiploymenit  rates in  Participants  provided  with  Quasi-  Upon completion,  participants  No information  provided
itn  Krainfors in  Sweden rose from 1.6  percent  classroom  training.  experimental  received lower  weekly wages  on re-employment  rates or
Northelrn  Sweden in  in 1976  to 2.2 percent by 1978.  than those not receiving  costs. Benefits from
1977 (OECD, 1991).  Employment in manufacturing  training. Drop in earnings are  retraining program were
declined by 8 percent between  especially significant in the first  insignificant.
1977 and 1979.  year with no appreciable  long-
term gains.
Over 3000 workers  A 25 percent decline in auto  Workers  were provided  a  Quasi-  Classroom  training (CT) did not  Earnings estimates varied
laid off due to auto and  production between 1978  atid  mixture ofjob search  assistance  experimental  significantly improve program  (ranging from negative to
auto parts plant  1980. Iligh unemilployment  (JSA) and classroom  training.  participants  post-program  re-  significantly  positive).
closures in Michiiganl  rates in 1981/82 nationally  (9.5  These services  were provided  employment  rate. Trainees did  Training did not seem to
(1980-83). The  percent) which had fallen to 7.5  promptly after plant closures.  no better than those receiving  have been very effective,
general profile  of those  percent by 1984.  Retraining was provided  in  JSA.  especially in light of fact
laid off was  Manufacturing employmilenit  occupations  in whichi  there was  that trainilig cost twice as
experienced blue collar  rose by 5 percent between 1983  perceived to be growing  much as JSA.
male workers who  and 1984.  demand. Training curricula
earned hiighi  wages  provided instructions  in blue
(Leigh, 1994).  collar trades.
Mass Layoffs due to  liigh unemployment  rates in  Displaced  workers were  Quasi-  JSA only services were found to  Classroom  training and
auto arid  steel plant  1981/82  nationally (9.5  provided  withi  a mixture of JSA  experimenital  have a fairly large impact on  OJT were ineffective. Cost
closunres  in Buffalo  percent) wlhich  had fallen to 7.5  and either classroom  or on the  earnings measured over the first  of CT and OJT programs
(1982-83). The  percent by 1984.  job training (OJT). Program  six post-program  months.  were around four times as
generall  profile of those  Manufacturing employment  services were provided  after a  However  there was no evidence  much as JSA, implying that
laid off was  rose by 5 percent between 1983  fairly  lengthiy  period of post-  of any incremental effect above  JSA was potentially the
experienced blue collar  and 1984.  layoff unemploymcnt.  that of JSA for either classroom  only cost effective
male workers who  training or OJT.  program. No evidence  was
earned high wages  provided about
(Cotrson,  Long and  employability  of program
Maynard, 1985).  participants.
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Labor Market  Relevant  Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Problem  Evaluation
Plant closuLes  at 13  Uncenploymenit  rates rose  JSA and traininig  was provided  to  Quasi-  Likelihood  of worket havitig  'I'raining  seems to have had a
steel factories and  between 1980  and 1983.  these  workers.  Experimental  ajob was seven percent  greater impact thani JSA.
minies  in Canada in thle  Employmnenit  in noni-  higher than comparably  However, no information  on
early i980s (Leigh,  agricultural  activities fell  displaced workers not in the  costs. Job couniselinig  had little
1992).  slightly over thie  tine  period.  program. '[his impact was  impact in  Canada as targeted
attributed to training which  job counseling is provided by
was used by 28 percent of  Canada's lPublic  E'mployment
workers. However  at two  Service as a standard service to
mining sites, the program had  all unemployed.
no impact.
445 workers were laid  Unlemploymenit  rates rose  Labor Adjustment  'I'raining  Quasi-  Over a nine month period,  No indication of cost-
off due to automobile  steadily in Australia  reaching a  Arrangement. Provision of  experimental  driver training increased  the  effectiveness  of different type
plant closure in  high of 9 percent in 1984  classroom  training (average  probability  of re-employment.  of training courses. Self-
Australia  in 1984  before falliig to 8 percent for  length 19 weeks) to meet  Ilowever, other traininig  selection  problem arose as
(Leigh, 1992).  the next few years. Between  retraining  needs of workers.  courses resulted in a decline  individuals who chose not to
1980 and 1984 employment in  Main distinction  between courses  in re-employment  participate were included in the
maniufactur  ing shrunik  by 4  was whether they provided driver  probabilities.  control group. Impact of
percent.  training  or not.  longer traininig  courses was
negative.
Around  2000 workers  Local economy  was given a  A significant  number of workers  Non -scientific  By November 1987,  over 90  Two major factors accounted
laid off at the  boost by decision of Volvo to  joined retraining  programs  percent of the workers who  for thie  success of the training
Uddevalla  shipyard in  establish  a car manufacturing  several months prior to being  had completed  training had  program - economy and labor
Sweden in 1985  plant at Uddevalla.  laid-off. Courses of varying  found  jobs or become self-  market conditions were
(Alfthani  and Janzoni,  Unemployment  rates were  duration were offered in welding,  employed - mnost  of them in  buoyant in the region
1994).  declininig  in this period while  engineer  ing and control  occupations  they had trainied  througlhout  the phase out
manufacturing  employment  enginieering.  'I'lTese  retraining  for.  period; shipyard management,
was fairly steady.  programs  were provided  by the  employment offices and
state owned training board,  training agencies worked in
municipal  education institutions  close cooperation.
and other adult education
institutions.
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Problem  Evaluation
TIhe  Volvo plant at  Volvo planned  to recruit 800  Retraining  program  was  Non-scientific  Not available as program too  Program costs are expected
Goteborg, Sweden  workers to prepare for the  proposed  which would help the  recent to be evaluated.  to be about $25 million
planined  to lay off 1000  productioni  of the new line of  existing workforce  to manage  ($25000 per person) close
workers in 1992  cars. Unemployment  rates  the change without  job loss. The  to half of which will be
associated with the  were risinig  sharply -fiom 3.2  company accepted  the proposal  paid by the government.
plhasinig  out of an older  percent in 1991  to 5.9 percent  under the stipulation  that the cost  In judging the cost-
car model with a new  in 1992.  Manufacturing  be shared by the government.  effectiveness  of this
model (Alftihan  and  employment dropped by 9  The program is a broad  program, it should be
Janzon, 1994).  percent in 1992.  Total  competency raising program  compared with the
employment also fell by four  which includes specific  traininig  expected unemployment
percent.  to piepare the participants  for the  benefits of $6.5 million the
production of the new  govemment would have to
automobiles.  pay.
Sweden: 1980s  and  Unemployment  rose steadily  Various  types  Various  types  Retraining programs  have  Cost-effectiveness  of
I 990s: general  over the period of study.  become more ineffective  over  training programs  hias
evaliation of public  time -especially  since the  declined both because
retraining programs  for  economy has begun  effectiveness has fallen and
those laid off en masse  deteriorating. Participants  have  costs have increased.
(OECD, 1991)  greater difficulty in finding  jobs
than the openly unemployed.
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Training  Programs  Geared  Towards  Youth
Labor Market IProblem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention Design  Type of  Result  Comments
E:valuation
Provide high school  Th1lere  was a sharp decline in  IProviding  classroom  training to  Experimental  No significanit  impact on  One site (San Jose) out of 13
dropouits  with skills to  uLicniployment  rates for  disadvantaged  youth.  employment  or earnings  had positive  earning gains.
make themil  more  youth from about 17% in the  over a four year follow up  Part of the reasons may have
employable  in the U.S.  mid 1980's to about 11% by  period of program  been because the training
dulring  the 1  990s (Fay,  1990. TIhis  had riseni  slightly  participants.  was closely linked to labor
1996)  over the next few years but  market needs.
held steady  at arounld  12%
since 1993.
IProvidinig  training (as well  TIime  period not knowin.  Youths provided  withi  classroom  Experimnental  No statistically  significant  No improvemenlt  in other
as othel programs) to out-  training,  on the job training and  positive impact on out-of-  indicators: youtIl crime or
of-school youth in AFDC  job search  assistance.  schiool  youth for any  welfare receipts by youth.
families in the U.S.  strategy.
(IDOL,  1995)
Providinig  training to  There was a shiarp  decline in  The U.S. Job Training  Experimental  No significant impact on  Costs=$2000 per trainee.
disadvantaged  youtil  unemployment  rates for  Partnership  Act. Youths  earnings.  Taking into  account costs,
nationially  in the U.S. fiom  youthi  firom  about 17% in the  provided  with classroom  real rate of return if expected
1983  onwards (Orr, et. al..  mid 1980's to about 1I% by  traininig  and on-the  job training  itnpact lasts 3 years or 10
1996; Friedlander,  et. al.,  1990. This had risen slightly  years is negative for both.
1997)  over the next few year's  but
held steady at arounid  12%
since 1993.
Iligli school dropouts  There was a sharp decline in  Jobstart demonstration  program.  Experimental  Insignificant  impact of  Expensive  program (over
provided  with skills in the  unemilployineit  rates for  Youths provided  with classroom  program on youths  $6000/traince). Hence real
U.S. betweren  1985-1988  youtil fiom about 17% in the  training.  earnings.  rate of return negative both
(Friedlander et. al., 1997)  mlid  1980's to about 1  1% by  in the short-r  un as well as in
1990. Tllis had risen slightly  the long-run.
over the next few years but
lheld  steady  at around 12%
since 1993.
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Labor Market Probleni  Relevanit  Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Training high-school  Canadian youth  Providing some individuals  with  Quasi-  Classroom  traininlg  had no impact
dropouts with employable  unemilployment  rates fell  classroom  training  and others  experimental  on earnings or employment
skills in Canada during the  from 22% to 14% during  with classroom  as well as  probability. Entcrprise  training
mid  to late 1980s  (OECD,  this period.  enterprise  training.  was relatively  effective for young
1993a)  men -with significant increases  in
employment  and earnings. No
impact on younig  women.
Provision  of skills to  There was a sharp decline  Both classroom  and workplace  Experimental  Participants  did no better than  Some improvement in
severely  disadvantaged  in unemiiploymilent  rates for  based training provided.  control group both in terms of  social results - reduction
youtil in  the U.S. in  the late  youth firom  about 17% in  earnilgs as well as employment.  of criminial  activity.
1980's (OECD, 1993a)  the mid 1980's to about
11  % by 1990. This had
risen slightly over the next
few years but held steady
at around 12%  since 1993.
Providing  out-of-school  Youth unemployment  Vocational  training courses  of  Quasi-  Those enrolled  in longer courses  Selection  bias problem.
youth with skills for the job  rates had reached double  varying  duration provided  to  experimental  were less likely to be employed
market in Norway 1990-91  digits and were slowly  school dropouts.  . than control group.  Those
(Fay, 1996)  rising during this period,  enirolled  in shiort  courses were
(lmore  likely to be employed.
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Micro-Enterprise  Development
Labor  Market Probleni  Relevant Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Coinmelits
Evaluation
Aid provided to newly  Unemployment rates  Participants  are eligible to receive  Experimental  Less than five percent of eligible  Evaluation performed 15
uliemployed  to lhelp  in  remained between 6-7%  a lump-sum  financial payment to  population  were interested in  months after participants
starting up small businiess  in the U.S..  Expendituires  start up small business,  or they  taking up program. Treatment  left program. Overall
in Washiingtoni  state in  late  on these programs in the  can choose  to receive a periodic  group more likely  to be employed  costs to IJI budget higher
1980s  (Fay,  1994).  U.S. was less thai  0.01%  allowance  for up to 26 weeks,  than control group. No significant  than that of the control
of GDP.  Participants  provided  optional  gains in total earnings,  group. Net cost-benefit
counselinig  /advisory service for a  Deadweight effect - 27 percent.  effect indeterimiinate.
short period afler starting  up
business.
Aid provided  to newly  Unemployment  rates were  Participants  receive  a periodic  Experimenital  Less thani  five percent of eligible  Evaluation perfoi-med  13
unliciiployed  to help in  about 7% in the early  paymenit  (for 24 weeks) to start  populationi  were interested  in  months after participants
starting up small business  1990s.  Expenditur  es on  up their businiess  and are required  taking up program. Treatment  left program. Overall
in Massachtisetts  in early  self-employment  programs  to attend an intenisive  business  group 14  percent more likely to be  costs to Ul budget higher
1990s  (Wilson and Adams,  were negligible,  advisory service after start up.  employed than control group and  than that of the control
1994).  earning significantly  more.  group. Net cost-benefit
Deadweight  effect = 30 percent.  effect not computed.
Assistance  to individuals in  Time period not knowil  Unemiiployed  individuals  given  Non-scientific  Suivival rate of business=50%  No estimates of
startinig  up small businiesses  grants to start up their-  own  after four years. Better qualified  deadweiglht  or
in the Netherlanids  (Meager  enterprises,  and sliglitly  older have higher  displacement.
and Evans, 1998)  suivival iates.
Assist individutals  in  Time period  too long  The l.K. Enterprise  allowance  Non-scientific  Deadweight=50-70%,
starting up businesses in  schemile  -unemilployed  individuials  displacement  is also high (about
the U.K. fi-om  the 1970's  given allowances to start-up  50% dependinig  on sector). Just
onwards (Meager and  enterprises.  0.2 additional  jobs created per
E  vans, 1998)  husiness  started.
62Appenidix 5.6  (continued)
Micro-Enterprise  Developmeint
Labor  Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Contracts awarded to six  Unemployment  rates fell  Individuals  with business  plans  Non-scientific  Significant  positive results  Evaluation performed
community  development  to 6.5% from 7.5% in  were provided financial  recorded  in job generation.  almost two years after start
organizationis  in tthe  U.S. to  1992. Expenditures  on  assistance  and counseling  on  However  average earnings of  up of business.
help unemilployed  start a  self-employment  programs  starting lip businesses.  participants  lower than in sites  Displacement/substitution/
businiess  between 1991-93  were negligible.  which did not receive this  dead weight loss not
(Fay, 1996)  assistance,  estimated.
Beginninig  in 1985,  Highlest  uLIemploymenlt  No screening used to approve  Quasi-  Two percent of unemployed  Low screening and
finanicial  assistance  rates among the Nordic  assistance  to participants.  experimental  participate in program. 60 percent  attractive program benefits
provided to those who have  countries  - around 9%  Periodic allowances  provided  for  of businesses  failed within the first  lower probability of
been unemployed for five  which rose to over 11% by  up to 3.5 years. However,  12  months. Deadweight  success and increase
montils within  the last eight  the early 1990s. Denmark  palticipants  are provided  effect=56%.  deadweight loss.
months to start up their  spent 0.1  1% of its GDI' on  counseling  on starting up a  Cost-$14,000 per
own cnterpriscs in  self-employment  business.  participant.
Denmark (Wilson and  promotion in the early
Adams, 1994)  1990s.
Beginning in 1979,  Average unemployment  Minimal screening used to  Quasi-  Below two percent of  Evaluation done in early
providing aid to  rate was close  to 9.5%  approve assistance  to  experimental  unemployed participated in  1991 of 1986 entrants.
unemployed to stalt up  throughi  the 1980's. It rose  participants. A lump sum  . program. Survival rates of  Cost=$4400  per
their own enterprise in  from about 8% in the early  payment given to entrepreneurs.  businesses  is 50 percent - lower  participant.
France (Wilson and  1980's to about 10% later  Participants  have to participate in  than that of start-up businesses  that
Adams, 1994)  on in the decade.  post-entry  training and business  did not receive  this assistance.
counseling.  Half an additional  job created for
each survivinig  enterprise.
Deadweight loss=60%
63Appendix  5.6  (contilnued)
Micro-Enterprise  Development
Labor Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Assist uniemployed  Amonig  the highest  Not available  Non- scientific  Survival  rate after two years was  Including additional  employees
individuals start up their  unemployment  rates in  60%. Deadweight loss=50%  and  hired by these enterprises,  "net
own enterprises in Ireland  EuLope  - averaging over  displacement=30%.  job creation was arouLid  34%.
durinig  the  miid  1980s  15% in the  1980s.
(OECD, 1993)  Irelanid  spent about
0.02% of its GDP on
these measures in the
late 1980s.
Assist unlemiiployed  to start  Unemploymiienit  rates of  Entrepreneurial  grants  Non-scientific  50% businesses  suivived after  Deadweighit  losses and
own enterpr  ises in Norway  arotiuid  5% in  Norway  provided  to unemilployed  four years. Younig  (below 25) as  displacemiienit  effects not
in 1989  and 1990  (Fay,  during this time.  wiling to start up their own  well as less educated  estimated.
1996).  business,  entrepreneurs fared poorly as did
those  who were the long-term
unemployed.
I lelp uncmployed start up  Australia's  Australia's New Enterprise  Non-scientific  Survival rate after one year was  Evaluation done in 1990-91. For
their own cnterprises in  unemilployment  rate was  Incenitive. Participants  42% and after two years was  each surviving enterprise about
Austtalia during 1987 and  dcclinlilng  fiom 8% in  provided  a subsidy  to start up  29%.  0.7 additional  jobs created.
1988  (OECD, 1993)  1986  to 6% in 1988  but  enterprise as well as training
thieni  rose sharply again  and business  counseling.
to around 10O%  by 1991.
UJnemploynmenit  instiurance  Canadian  Canada's Self-Employment  Quasi-  Over 80 percent of businesses  Evaluation done within two years
and social assistance  uniemilployment  rates had  Assistance  Program.  experimental  surviving. Deadweight loss over  after program. Participants  draw
claimianits  given finanicial  risenl  fiom 8% in 1990  Participants  receive 52 weeks  50%. Programii  participants  carn  $2000 less thatn  comparisoni
assistance  to star-t  up their  to 12% by 1993. By  of incomiie  sUpport  and  sigihificantty  more than  groUp  from  IJI  but this does not
own businesses  in Canada  1995,  they had fallen  contribute  25% out of their  comparison  group (about  take into consideration  the
in 1  992-93 (G(raves  and  again to arouLid  10%.  own pocket (up to $4000) in  $200/month) but work  additional $13000 that was spent
Gauthier, 1995)  cash or in-kind  to start a full-  significantly longer  hlouirs  on program. Long-tern impact
time business venture.  (14/week)  so no impact on hotirly  of program uncer  tain.
eamnings.
64Appendix  5.6  (continued)
Micro-Enterprise  Development
Labor  Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
Aid displaced and long-  Sharp rise in  Self-employment  assistance  Quasi-  80 percent of enterprises survived  Evaluation done in 10
term unemployed  workers  untemployment:  from  provided  to individuals  eligible  experimental  15 mnonths.  Participants 13 percent  counties.  No measure
to stalt up their own  below one percent at the  for unemployment  benefits.  more likely to be employed than  of displacement  or
business in Hlungary  in the  turn of the decade  to 12  Assistance  is provided  in  comparison  group, but earning  deadweiglht.  Each
mid 1990s (O'Lcary,  percent by 1994. After  monthly payments  equal to  significantly  less. Older  surviving  enterprise
1998a)  falling continuously for  unemployment  compensation  for  participants  and women do better.  created 0.3 additional
five years, real GDP  a period  of Lip  to 18 months.  jobs.
started growing slowly.  Business counseling  and training
Of spending on activc  are also provided.
programiis  lcss thani  5
percent spenit  on  these
schemes.
Aid displaced and long-  GDP started growing  Self-employment  assistance,  up  Quasi-  85 percent of enterprises  had  Evaluation  done in 8
term unemployed workers  slowly from 1994 but  to 20 times the minimum  wage,  experimental  survived 24 months. Participants  counties. Program
to start up their own  unemployment  rate rose  is provided  to unemployed  30 percent more likely to be  seems very successful.
business in Poland in the  fromn  0% in 1989  to 16%  individuals. Loans' principal  is  employed and earn significantly  However, no measure of
carly and mid 1990s  by 1994,  though it has  reduced by 50 percent if business  more than control group. Older  displacement  or
(O'Leary, 1998b)  declined since. In 1994,  survives two years,  participants  and women do better.  deadweight. Cost-
below 0.5% of  benefit  analysis points
expenditures  on active  towards  a societal  "loss"





Labor  Market Problem  Relevant In(licators  Interveiition  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
P'rovicding  subsidies to hire  Among the highest  Fmployers  paid between 30-60  Non-  Deadweight loss-70%,  400 firmis  who hired
long-terill  unelmclployed  in  unlemploymenit  rates in ELurope  Irish potiunds/week  for up to 24  scientific  substitution=21%,  subsidized individuals
Ircland in the 1980's  - averaging over 15% in the  weeks, contingent on worker  displacement=4%. 1-lence  "net"  interviewed. No
(OECD, 1993)  1980S.  remaining  with firm. 'Ihis is about  effect=5%  information  on cost
30-50%  of gross wages.  available. Subsidies
almost completely
ineffective.
Emiiployers  given subsidies  Unemploymenit  rates falling  Employers paid up to  Non-  Deadweight over 65 percent.  1000 workers who were
to hire long teriml  fiom 9% to 7% during this  AU$200/week  for up to 16 weeks  scientific  subsidized,  and firms in
unemilployed  in Australia in  period. Australia  spent about  (approximately  50% of gross  which they worked, were
mid 1980s  (Mangatn,  0.03% of its GDP on these  wages) to hire the long-tern  interviewed.
1988).  measures.  uncmployed
Increasinig  employability  of  Unemilploymiienit  r ates falling  IThe  JOB schemne.  Subsidies  given  Non-  H-ligh  deadweight loss  about 22-  No control group, hence
loIng-term  un????employed  fiom 9% to 7% durinig  this  to employers  to hire youth who  scientific  30%. Very little evidence of  no measure of net
youth by providinig  wage  period. Austialia spent about  have been unemployed  for two  net increase in total  impact. Deadweight
subsidies in lHollanid  duLinlg  0.03% of its GDP on these  years or more.  employment. Intervention  does  could be as high as 80%
the late 1980s (Meager and  measures.  increase  probability of  as another 50% of
EvIns, 1998)  employmnent  of long-term  individuals may have
unemployed youth, but by less  found a job anyway.
thanl  10%.
Increase  the employability  Dutchi  unemilploymenit  rates  Subsidies  given to firms to hire  Quasi-  Substitution  effect=80%.  Less thani  20% of new
of the long-tenn  were falling steadily fiom 8%  individtuals  who have been  experimental  jobs were additional to
unemployed, providing  to 5% dtrinig  thiis  period.  unemployed for two years (or  what would have been
wage subsidies  to  Speniciilig  less than 0.03%/O  of  ethniic  minorities  who have been  accomplished  withotit
employers  to  iluc thelin  (Ditl' on wage subsidies.  unemilployed  a year).  the prograimi.
HIolland  durinig  the late
1980s  (OECI), 1993)
66Appendix  5.7  (continued)
Wage/Employment  Subsidies
Labor  Market Problem  Relevant Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
P'rogram  to promote  Unemployment rates  'I'he U.S. Targeted  Job Tax Credit.  Experimental  Significant  impact on job  Some stidies have also
employment  of  remained between 6-7% in  Employers  paid up to 50% of  earnings in first year relative  suggested a negative
disadvantaged  urban  the U.S..  Negligible  eligible  wages for two years.  to control; however, impact  impact on employment
population in the 1J.S. in  expenditur  es on these  Employees  either got vouchers that  decreases in second year. No  of targeted persons,
the m  id 1980s  (OECD,  programs.  they took to firms, or employers  longer  term impact once  perhaps resulting  firom  a
1993)  got the money directly  after  subsidy is removed.  "stigmatizing"  effect.
submitting  applications  for workers
they decided to hiire.
Increase employability  of  'Iime period not knowin  A reduction  in payroll taxes  of  Experimental  No positive impact of subsidy
unemiiployed  in Sweden  employers  who hire long-terimi  on employment
(Meager and Evans, 1998)  unemployed.
Programil  to promote  Timc period too long  Under  the UJ.S.  Job Training  Experimental  Significant  impact on earnings  Single mothers who are
employmlienit  of  Placemenit  Act (JTPA) employers  for women. However, impact  on Assistance  to
disadvantaged  workers in  were provided  subsidies  to hire  on men only partly significant.  Families with Dependent
the U.S. (Bloom, 1994)  workers mainly to provide  on-the-  Children (AFDC) benefit
job traininig.  most.
Program targeted at highi  U.K. uniemployment  rates rose  Wage grant offered for trainees  Non scientific  Deadweight loss=20%.  Displacement  effect not
uliemployment  areas to  from 6% in 1989 to 10% by  varying,  from 50% to 100%  of the  Additional  jobs created over  estimated. Low
provide  wage subsidies  to  1992. However,  expenditures  trainees wages for a period of 6  25%  deadweight loss  may be
the unemployed  and those  on these programs remained  motiths,  and entire traiting costs  due to employers being
at r  isk in Scotland 1989-  negligible.  also covered. Employers  had to  forced to declare at the
1992  (NERA, 1995)  employ individual  in a full time  job  outset that the job would
lasting  at least one year.  not have been offered in
the absence of a subsidy.
67Appendix  5.7  (continued)
Wage/Employment  Subsi(lies
Labor Market Problem  Relevaiit  Indicators  Iintervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comnelits
Evaluation
Wage subsidy  provided to  Proportionl  of long-term  Subsidy given to employees. To  Quasi-  Deadweight  loss=69 percent.  Evaluation  performed
the long-term unlemilployed  unlemilployed  in total  get subsidy, participants  had to  experimental  No significant  eam-ings  or  three months after
to get themii  back into tile  unlemilployed  declined  fiom  earn below 90 pounids  per week  employment impact.  subsidy  ended.  30
labor  force in Englanid  about 45% to 30%.  and work at least 35 hours/week.  percent of individuals
between 1986 and 1990  Unemilploymilenit  rates fell fi-om  The  job had to be at least thiree  had left/been let go by




Wage subsidies  provided in  Proportioni  of long-teriml  The Traininig  and Employmenit  Non-  Deadweight loss=47%  and  ?????
the U.K. in the late 1980s  unlemiiployed  in total  Grant Scheme. Employers  got  scientific  substitution=23%.
(NlE'RA,  1995).  T his was  uLnemilployed  declined  firom  between 50-60%  of gross wages  Additionality=27%
mainly targeted at the  about 45% to 30%.  for up to six months and had to
youth and long-term  UJnemilploymilenit  r  ates fell firom  pl  ovide 200 hours of structured
unlemployed  in high  12% in 1986  to 6% in 1990.  training.
unemployment  areas.
Wage subsidies  targeted at  Tine  period not known  The Youn1g  Workers Schenme,  Non-  Deadweight=63%  and  Targeting  done on the
youth in the U.K.  Eligible  employers  paid 15  scientific  Substitution=  10%.  basis of choice of
(Balakrishlinan,  1998)  pounds/week  for up to a year to  Additionality=27%  eligible firms.
hire younig  unemployed  (under 18).
Wage subsidies  given to  tJlnemlploylmlelnt  rates at around  Any additional employees  hired by  Non-  Deadweight=60-75%.  Substitutioni  is zero by
small finns to hire  5%.  small manufacturing  firms in  scientific  Additionality=25-40%  definition, as there was
unlelmiployed  workers in the  special developmenit  areas were  no untargeted group of
U.K. in the early 1970s.  subsidized Up  to 20 pounds/week  workers who could be
for up to 26 weeks.  substituted against.
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Wage/Employment  Subsidies
Labor  Market Problem  Relevant  Indicators  Intervention  Design  Type of  Result  Comments
Evaluation
T  o enhanlce  employment  Higli and rising rates of  Employers  given a wage subsidy  Non-  Deadweight  effect=53% and  Negligible net
prospects  of long-term  unemiploymenit  - 9% in 1991  for a period  of up to six months.  scientific  substifttion=36%  employment  effect.
unemployed,  employers  to 12% in 1993. ILong-term
provided  subsidies  to hire  unlemiploymiienit  over 60% of
tlhem  in Belgiumti  in the  total unemployment. 0.05%
early 1990s (Fay, 1996)  of GDP spent on these
measures.
I lave re-employment  Unemployment rates generally  Uployloyed workers provided  Experimental  Weeks of benefit fell in all  Due to the higih  costs of
bonuses worked in getting  stable in the U.S. during the  bonuses if they could find work  four experiments.  Effect was  the progreams,  societal
people of Ul be?efits and  periods of the experihmenits.  withinl  a specified  period. E.g. in  strongest in Illinois whaere  it  benefits varied.  They
into better  jobs?  An  Illinois,  an unemployed  individual  fell by a week (average weeks  were positive in Illinois
experimcntal study of the  would receive a bonis of $500  of benefit received ranged  and Pennsylvania
employment bonus  (four times the average  weekly Ul  from 15-20). Experiments also  (slightly) but negative in
experiments in Illinois  benefit) if they found employment  show no significant declines in  New Jersey and
(1984), New Jersey (1986-  withlin  I I weeks of filing  for Ul  re-employment earnings.  In  Washington on the
87), Pennsylvania (1988-  and kept the job for at least four  fact, in Illinois, the treatment  whole.  Similar results
89) and Washington  months.  group had slightly higher  found for Illinois by
(1988) (Meyer, 1995).  earnings than the control  Woodbuiy and
group.  Spiegelman (1987).
Only in one case was
bonus provided to
employers - in that case
effect was insignificant.
Emiiployers  provided  Sharp rise in unemploymelit:  Payment  of up to 50% of wage  Quasi-  Participants  are 10 percent less  Evaluation done over
subsidies to hire the long-  from below one percent at the  made  to employers  to hire  experimental.  likely to be employed, and earn  year after program
term unemployed in  turn of tlhe  decade  to 12  individuals  who were previously  significantly  less, than control  completion,  in 10
Ilungary rnid-1990s  pcrccnt by 1994. After falliig  unemployed for at least six months.  group in current job.  counties.
(O'Leary, 1998a)  continuously  for five years,  If workers are not retained  by firm
real (iDP started growing  after subsidy ends for a period as
slowly. Of spendinig  on active  long as the subsidy  was paid,
prograrns,  over 12 percent  employer  must repay the subsidy.
spent on these schemes.
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In this paper,  we survey  evidence based  on the evaluation of active labor
market programs.  We have  examined about 1  00 evaluations. Many of
these  studies  have already been summarized by others (such as  OECD
and ILO), hut we have  also included a significant number of individual
studies. And though most studies  apply to OECD countries  - mainly
the U.S., Canada, U.K., Sweden  and Germany -we  have  added
information on developing and transition economies such as Hungary,
Poland,  the Czech Republic,  Turkey  and Mexico. While it can be argued
that the lessons  from developed countries  on the effectiveness  of these
programs  may not be directly applicable to developing countries, it is
unlikely that these programs  will  be more successful  in developing
countries given the scarcity  of administrative capacity to implement
these  programs  and the paucity of monitoring and evaluation  experience
to study  their effectiveness.
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